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2 
Introduction 
When  David  Hume  published  his  literary  debut  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  in 
1738,  it  could  hardly  be  called  a  success.  It  was  largely  ignored  by  both  the  public 
and  the  press,  and  the  initial  printing  of  a  thousand  copies  never  sold  out  during 
his  own  lifetime.  The  few  reviews  that  did  get  published  were  largely  negative. 
The  book’s  reception  must  have  been  a  great  disappointment  to  the  young 
Hume,  whose  desperation  even  drove  him  as  far  as  to  write  an  elaborate 
anonymous  review  of  his  own  work.  He  would  later  write  how  the  book  ‘fell 
dead-born  from  the  press,  failing  to  elicit  even  a  murder  from  the  zealots.’  It  was 
only  a er  Hume’s  death  that  the  Treatise  began  to  be  recognised  as  one  of  the 
great  philosophical  works.  Today,  it  is  not  only  widely  regarded  as  the  greatest 
achievement  of  Hume’s  philosophical  career,  but  also  as  one  of  the  most 
important  works  in  Western  philosophy.  
  Hume’s  Treatise  has  since  become  known  for  its  highly  original 
exploration  of  the  mind-body  problem.  In  contrast  to  earlier  philosophers  like 
Descartes,  Hume  argued  objects  –  and  therefore  the  human  self  –  do  not  exist 
independently.  Rather,  what  we  subconsciously  observe  as  objects  is  in  fact  a 
bundle  of  perceptions.  In  other  words,  Hume  saw  any  given  object  as  an  ever 
changing  collection  of  properties  acquired  during  a  lifetime  of  individual 
experience  and  observation. 
  However,  from  the  1960s  onwards,  scholars  began  to  question  the 
originality  of  Hume’s  bundle  theory .  There  was  a  growing  awareness  of  the 
remarkable  similarity  between  Hume’s  philosophical  explorations  and  the 
Buddhist  idea  of  the  not-self ,  which  holds  that  the  independent  self  is  nothing 
but  a  ﬁction,  consisting  of  the  ﬁve  aggregates  known  as  the  skandhas :  those 
elements  that  constitute  the  sentient  being.  As  early  as  1969,  Nolan  Jacobsen 
posited  ‘the  possibility  of  Oriental  inﬂuence  in  Hume’s  philosophy’.   Moreover, 1
the  philosopher  and  psychologist  James  Giles  has  more  recently  challenged  the 
long-held  view  of  Hume  as  a  proponent  of  bundle  theory.  Instead,  he  asserts 
that  Hume  argued  for  the  elimination  of  the  self  altogether.   If  this 2
interpretation  is  accurate,  this  would  signify  an  even  greater  convergence  with 
1  Nolan  Pliny  Jacobsen,  ‘The  Possibility  of  Oriental  Inﬂuence  in  Hume’s  Philosophy’,  Philosophy 
East  and  West ,  19  (1)  17-37  (1969).  
2  James  Giles,  No  Self  to  be  Found:  The  Search  for  Personal  Identity ,  Lanham:  University  Press  of 
America  (1997). 
3 
the  Buddhist  concept  of  the  not-self.  
  Yet  despite  the  similarities  between  the  philosophy  of  Hume  and 
Buddhist  thought,  scholars  have  struggled  to  ﬁnd  any  concrete  evidence  linking 
the  two.  Either  it  must  have  been  a  case  of  independent  convergence  or  there 
may  have  been  a  more  general  inﬂuence  of  Buddhist  thought  on  eighteenth 
century  enlightenment  philosophy.  There  was  little  reason  to  believe  otherwise. 
Even  a er  centuries  of  contact  with  Buddhist  populations,  eighteenth  century 
Europeans  were  still  largely  unfamiliar  with  Buddhist  thought.  Buddhism  had 
all  but  died  out  in  India,  Japan  was  in  the  middle  of  a  period  of  centuries-long 
isolation,  whereas  Europeans  who  travelled  to  China  were  more  interested  in  the 
Taoïst  and  Confucian  traditions  of  the  Chinese  court.   There  was  of  course 3
sustained  contact  between  Europeans  and  Buddhist  populations  in  Asia,  but  this 
does  not  automatically  imply  the  transfer  of  profound  philosophical  knowledge 
and  understanding.  Whatever  knowledge  of  Buddhism  Europeans  had  was  little 
more  than  superﬁcial,  and,  according  to  tradition,  not  until  the  nineteenth 
century  did  European  intellectuals  become  fully  acquainted  with  Buddhist 
philosophy.  Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche  in  particular  have  been  noted  for  their 
fascination  with  Buddhism  and  the  inﬂuence  of  Buddhist  philosophy  on  their 
own  ideas,  as  have  the  theosophists,  who  in  turn  exerted  great  inﬂuence  over 
European  thinkers  and  artists  of  the  late  nineteenth  century. 
  However,  recent  studies  have  challenged  that  long-held  narrative.  In  a 
2009  article,  psychologist  and  Hume  scholar  Alison  Gopnik  claimed  to  have 
found  a  credible  historical  link  connecting  David  Hume  to  Buddhist  thought.  4
This  link  is  the  Jesuit  Royal  College  of  La  Flèche  in  Anjou,  France.  Hume  had 
lived  in  La  Flèche  between  1735  –  1737  as  a  young  man,  shortly  before  the 
publication  of  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature .  In  fact,  he  wrote  his  Treatise  at  La 
Flèche.  It  was  in  this  highly  intellectual  environment  that  Hume  could  have 
become  one  of  the  ﬁrst  European  intellectuals  to  gain  a  thorough  philosophical 
understanding  of  Buddhism.  Gopnik  argues  that  at  least  one  Jesuit  at  La  Flèche, 
the  sophisticated  and  well-traveled  Charles  Francois  Dolu,  would  have  obtained 
3   The  disappearance  of  Buddhism  from  India  coincided  with  the  fall  of  the  Pala  dynasty  in  the 
12th  century  and  the  subsequent  Muslim  invasions,  but  the  exact  causes  for  Buddhism’s 
disappearance  from  the  subcontinent  remain  a  matter  of  dispute.  See:  Dilip  Kumar  Barua,  ‘The 
Causes  of  the  Decline  of  Buddhism  in  the  Indo-Bangladesh  Sub-continent’,  Society  for  the  Study 
of  Pali  and  Buddhist  Culture  12  (13)  (1999),  pp.  13-31;  Grigory  Solomonovich  Pomerants,  ‘The 
Decline  of  Buddhism  in  Medieval  India’,  Diogenes  24  (96)  (1976),  pp.  38-66.  
4  Alison  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known  about  Buddhism?  Charles  Francois  Dolu,  the 
Royal  College  of  La  Flèche,  and  the  Global  Jesuit  Intellectual  Network’,  Hume  Studies  35  (1&2), 
2009,  pp.  5-28. 
4 
knowledge  of  Theravada  Buddhism  through  his  missionary  eﬀorts  in  Siam. 
Dolu  stayed  at  La  Flèche  from  1723  –  1740,  meaning  his  stay  overlapped  with 
that  of  Hume.  Moreover,  Dolu  had  spoken  at  some  length  to  Ippolito  Desideri, 
an  Italian  Jesuit  who  in  1727  spent  two  weeks  at  La  Flèche.  Desideri  was  one  of 
the  few  Europeans  to  have  visited  Tibet,  and  it  was  Desideri  who,  during  his  stay 
there  from  1716  –  1721,  became  the  ﬁrst  European  with  extensive  knowledge  of 
both  the  Tibetan  language  and  Tibetan  Buddhism.  Ippolito  Desideri’s  book  on 
Tibet  is  now  recognised  as  the  most  accurate  and  detailed  European  account  of 
Buddhism  before  the  twentieth  century.  Unfortunately,  it  was  never  published, 
and  was  not  rediscovered  until  the  late  nineteenth  century,  nearly  two  hundred 
years  later.   5
  If  Alison  Gopnik  is  right  and  Hume  did  acquire  knowledge  of  Buddhist 
philosophy  through  the  Jesuits  of  La  Flèche  the  implications  would  be 
enormous,  not  just  for  Hume  scholarship,  but  for  our  perceptions  of  the 
Enlightenment  itself.  It  would  imply  the  existence  of  a  far  stronger  East-West 
transfer  of  knowledge  and  ideas  in  early  modern  times  than  previously  thought. 
Indeed,  a  growing  number  of  scholars  now  recognises  the  mutual  inﬂuence 
between  European  and  Asian  schools  of  thought  in  early  modern  times.   Jesuit 6
missionaries  served  as  highly  educated  agents  of  exchange  between  Europe  and 
Asia.  Both  Charles  Francois  Dolu  and  Ippolito  Desideri  were,  in  the  words  of 
Gopnik,  part  of  ‘a  network  of  philosophically,  culturally,  and  scientiﬁcally 
knowledgeable  Jesuits,  with  connections  to  both  La  Flèche  and  Asia.’  7
  Though  fascinating,  Gopnik’s  study  still  leaves  the  reader  with  many 
questions.  Refraining  from  making  grandiose  statements,  she  rightly  concludes 
that  we  may  never  know  the  deﬁnitive  answer  as  to  whether  Hume  was 
inﬂuenced  by  Buddhism.  Instead,  she  merely  explores  the  historical  possibility 
of  Buddhist  inﬂuence  on  Hume  during  his  stay  at  La  Flèche.  This  is  both  her 
strength  and  her  weakness.  On  the  one  hand,  it  shields  her  from  harsh  criticism, 
but  on  the  other  hand,  she  never  fully  determines  the  plausibility  of  said 
5  For  the  most  recent  and  complete  translation  of  Desideri’s  account,  see:  Mission  to  Tibet:  The 
Extraordinary  Eighteenth-Century  Account  of  Father  Ippolito  Desideri  S.J. ,  transl.  Michael  Sweet,  ed. 
Leonard  Zwilling  (Boston  2010). 
6  As  early  as  1950  Raymond  Schwab  recognised  the  importance  of  the  ‘Orient’  in  European 
literary  and  intellectual  life  in  the  18th  and  19th  centuries.  For  the  English  translation,  see: 
Raymond  Schwab,  The  Oriental  Renaissance:  Europe’s  Rediscovery  of  India  and  the  East,  1680-1880 , 
transl.  Gene  Petterson-King  and  Victor  Reinking  (New  York  1984);  For  a  recent  study  on  the 
inﬂuence  of  Chinese  Buddhism  on  French  Enlightenment  thought,  see:  Jeﬀrey  D.  Burson, 
‘Unlikely  Tales  of  Fo  and  Ignatius:  Rethinking  the  Radical  Enlightenment  through  French 
Appropriation  of  Chinese  Buddhism’,  French  Historical  Studies ,  38  (3),  2015,  pp.  391-420. 
7  Gopnik,  ‘David  Hume’,  p.6. 
5 
inﬂuence  on  Hume.  Moreover,  Gopnik’s  analysis  of  Hume  in  relation  to 
Theravada  and  Tibetan  Buddhism  suﬀers  from  the  human  tendency  to  stress 
the  similarities  between  two  diﬀerent  objects  or  ideas,  rather  than  their 
fundamental  diﬀerences,  especially  when  they  are  so  far  separated  by  time  and 
space.  Most  importantly,  however,  because  Gopnik’s  ultimate  goal  is  to  establish 
a  Hume-Buddhist  connection,  she  never  really  explores  other  possible 
inﬂuences  on  Hume  in  any  detail.  She  does  state  Hume  was  ‘clearly  inﬂuenced 
by  a  general  European  skeptical  tradition  that  had  many  features  in  common 
with  Buddhism’,   but  that  is  still  a  vague  statement  at  best.  It  is  almost  as  if  the 8
inﬂuence  of  the  general  European  skeptical  tradition  on  Hume’s  philosophy  is 
deliberately  downplayed  in  order  to  strengthen  her  own  Buddhist  hypothesis.  
  In  fact,  many  of  the  Humean  ideas  that,  according  to  Gopnik,  so  strongly 
resemble  Buddhist  thought  are  also  prevalent  in  the  ‘European  skeptical 
tradition’.  Interestingly,  one  of  these  European  schools,  the  ancient  Greek 
Pyrrhonian  school  of  philosophy,  named  a er  the  obscure  Pyrrho  of  Elis  (c.  360 
BC  –  c.  270  BC)  has  also  been  linked  to  Buddhism,   and  some  scholars  even 9
argue  that  Pyrrhonism  is  in  fact  a  Greek  reinvention  of  Buddhism,  imported 
from  Asia  by  the  ancient  Greeks  following  Alexander  the  Great’s  conquests.  10
While  most  Pyrrhonian  texts  have  either  been  lost  or  destroyed,  Pyrrhonism 
survived  through  the  writings  of  Sextus  Empiricus  (c.  160  –  c.  210  CE).  Sextus 
Empiricus’  work  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism  in  turn  was  rediscovered  in  the  16th 
century  a er  having  disappeared  from  European  intellectual  life  for  over  a 
millennium.  Henricus  Stephanus  published  an  inﬂuential  Latin  translation  of 
the  Outlines  in  1562,   which  was  quickly  followed  by  Gentian  Hervet’s  Latin 
translation  of  Sextus  Empiricus’  complete  works  in  1569.  The  Greek  original  was 
ﬁnally  published  in  1621  by  Petrus  and  Jacobus  Chouet,  decades  a er  the 
publication  of  the  Latin  translation.  Sextus  Empiricus  was  widely  read  in  Europe 
during  the  16th,  17th,  and  18th  centuries,  and  by  French  intellectuals  in 
particular.  Prominent  thinkers  who  studied  the  works  include  Michel  de 
Montaigne,  Descartes,  Blaise  Pascal,  Pierre-Daniel  Huet  and  François  de  La 
Mothe  Le  Vayer.  Yet  it  was  David  Hume  who  would  arguably  go  on  to  become 
8  Ibid.,  p.19. 
9  On  the  philosophical  similarities  between  Madhyamaka  Buddhism  and  Pyrrhonism,  see: 
Thomas  McEvilley,  The  Shape  of  Ancient  Thought:  Comparative  Studies  in  Greek  and  Indian 
Philosophies  (New  York  2002)  pp.  800-871. 
10  For  authors  making  historical  claims,  see:  Adrian  Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism:  How  the  Greeks 
Reinvented  Buddhism  (Lanham  2010);  Christopher  I.  Beckwith,  Greek  Buddha:  Pyrrho’s  Encounter 
with  Buddhism  in  Central  Asia  (Princeton/Oxford  2015).  
6 
the  most  famous  critic  of  Pyrrhonism.  
  Unfortunately,  the  parallels  between  Hume,  Buddhism,  and  Pyrrhonian 
skepticism  are  rarely  studied  together.  Comparative  studies  on  Hume  and 
Buddhism,  Hume  and  Pyrrhonism,  and  Buddhism  and  Pyrrhonian  skepticism 
do  exist,  but  all  of  these  remain  largely  isolated  ﬁelds  of  study.  The  precise 
nature  of  their  relation  is  still  something  of  a  mystery.  This  study  aims  to  unify 
these  diﬀerent  comparative  approaches  by  analysing  both  the  possible  Buddhist 
and  the  apparent  Pyrrhonian  inﬂuences  in  Hume’s  Treatise .  However,  rather 
than  merely  establishing  the  possibility  of  Buddhist  or  Pyrrhonian  inﬂuences  on 
Hume,  the  goal  is  to  determine  the  likelihood  of  such  an  inﬂuence,  both  through 
comparative  philosophical  analysis  and  through  historical  arguments.  While  it  is 
certainly  not  the  ﬁrst  study  to  investigate  the  possible  inﬂuence  of  Buddhist  and 
Pyrrhonian  thought  on  Hume,  it  is  one  of  the  ﬁrst  to  take  into  account  the  La 
Flèche  connection  as  discovered  by  Gopnik.   Until  now,  historians  have  by  and 11
large  ignored  the  subject,  whereas  philosophers  are  generally  more  interested  in 
studying  the  philosophical  similarities  between  Hume’s  writings  and  Buddhist 
thought  than  in  historical  arguments.   Given  the  fact  that  Hume  was  both  a 12
philosopher  and  a  historian — he  was  primarily  known  as  a  historian  during  his 
lifetime — this  may  seem  ironic,  but  it  is  true  that  history  and  philosophy  are  two 
fundamentally  diﬀerent  academic  disciplines.  Specialists  in  both  ﬁelds  tend  to 
focus  on  whatever  they  are  most  familiar  with,  whereas  the  generally 
disciplinary  orientation  of  most  scholarly  journals  forms  another  barrier  against 
interdisciplinary  research.  However,  to  be  able  to  study  possible  Buddhist 
inﬂuence  on  Hume,  such  an  interdisciplinary  approach  is  virtually  required.  It  is 
impossible  to  read  Hume  without  a  certain  degree  of  philosophical 
understanding,  whereas  without  the  historical  context  one  can  do  little  more 
than  compare  the  philosophical  similarities  and  diﬀerences  between  Hume’s 
writings  and  other  schools  of  philosophy. 
  This  becomes  even  more  diﬃcult  when  one  takes  into  account  that 
historical,  and  philosophical  analysis  in  particular,  rely  to  a  great  extent  on 
interpretation.  Hume  scholarship  is  no  diﬀerent  in  that  regard.  Throughout 
11  Jay  Garﬁeld  has  recently  commented  on  Gopnik’s  study,  but  his  treatment  of  the  La  Flèche 
connection,  which  he  quickly  dismisses,  is  unsatisfying,  see:  Jay  Garﬁeld,  Hume  as  a  Western 
Mādhyamika:  The  Case  from  Ethics  (2015). 
12  For  a  recent  study  that  mentions  Gopnik’s  claim  but  ignores  the  historical  argument,  see: 
Yumiko  Inukai,  ‘The  World  of  the  Vulgar  and  the  Ignorant  Hume  and  Nagarjuna  on  the 
Substantiality  and  Independence  of  Objects’,  Res  Philosophica ,   92  (3),  2015,  pp.  621-651. 
7 
history,  Hume’s  Treatise  has  been  subject  to  various,  o en  opposed, 
interpretations  that  can  roughly  be  divided  into  two  distinct  categories.  Hume  is 
either  seen  as  a  radical  skeptic  or,  in  contrast,  as  a  naturalistic  philosopher.   His 13
earliest  Scottish  critics  in  the  late  18th  century  universally  viewed  Hume  as  a 
‘destructive’,  systematic  skeptic,  bent  on  destroying  our  common  sense  beliefs  in 
causality,  the  independent  existence  of  objects,  and  the  belief  in  the 
independent  self.  Such  readings  place  Hume  ﬁrmly  within  the  British 
Locke-Berkeley  tradition  of  British  empiricism,  and  these  skeptical 
interpretations  of  Hume  remained  dominant  until  well  into  the  20th  century.  In 
fact,  despite  having  lost  much  of  its  credibility,  the  view  of  Hume  as  a  radical 
skeptical  empiricist  is  still  championed  by  many  to  this  day.   From  the  1940s 14
onwards,  however,  scholars  increasingly  began  to  stress  the  naturalistic,  rather 
than  the  skeptical  nature  of  Hume’s  Treatise .  In  this  view,  Hume’s  Treatise  must 
be  read  as  an  exploration  of  human  nature,  in  which  Hume  ultimately  concludes 
feeling,  and  not  reason,  reigns  supreme.  A er  all,  belief  is  the  result  of  the 
sensitive,  rather  than  the  rational  part  of  our  nature.  In  this  naturalistic 
interpretation  of  Hume,  he  is  no  longer  the  destructive,  radical  skeptic  of  old, 
but  a  moral  philosopher  who  was  deeply  inﬂuenced  by  both  Francis  Hutcheson 
and  Newtonian  physics.  A  more  recent  interpretation  argues  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  view  Hume  as  either  a  committed  skeptic  or  a  naturalist.  Instead, 
Hume’s  Treatise  is  seen  as  an  attempt  to  introduce  the  experimental  method  of 
reasoning  into  the  philosophy  of  morality,  which  would  paradoxically  make 
Hume  both  a  skeptic  and  a  naturalist.   From  this  perspective,  Hume  aspired  to 15
become  the  ‘Newton  of  the  Moral  Sciences’.  16
  Whereas  the  study  of  Hume’s  philosophy  is  problematic,  the  study  of 
Buddhist  philosophy  is  arguably  even  more  gruelling.  Buddhism  has  a  rich  and 
ancient  tradition,  consisting  of  many  diﬀerent  schools  of  thought  that  at  times 
directly  oppose  one  another.  Buddhist  ideas  have  been  recorded  within  a  vast 
13  Norman  Kemp  Smith  was  arguably  the  ﬁrst  scholar  to  recognize  the  skepticist/naturalist 
dichotomy,  and  it  is  still  widely  recognised  to  this  day,  see:  Norman  Kemp  Smith,  The 
Philosophy  of  David  Hume  (London  1941);  For  a  more  recent  overview  of  this  dichotomy,  see: 
Paul  Russell,  The  Riddle  of  Hume’s  Treatise:  Skepticism,  Naturalism,  and  Irreligion  (Oxford  2008)  pp. 
1-10.  
14  Russell,  The  Riddle  of  Hume’s  Treatise  pp.  1-10. 
15  See:  John  Arthur  Passmore,  Hume’s  Intentions  (Duckworth  1980). 
16  For  a  more  detailed  overview  of  the  debate  on  the  nature  of  Hume’s  skepticism,  see:  Russell,  The 
Riddle  of  Hume’s  Treatise ,  pp.  1-10;  In  their  respective  biographies  of  Hume,  both  Mossner  and 
most  recently  Harris  portray  Hume  as  a  kind  of  moderate  skeptic ,  with  Mossner  famously 
describing  Hume  as  le  bon  David ,  a  mild-mannered,  compassionate,  gentleman  who  eschewed 
radical  skepticism,  See:  Mossner:  The  Life  of  David  Hume,  p.  4;  James  A.  Harris ,  Hume:  An 
Intellectual  Biography  (Cambridge  University  Press  2015),  pp.  94-121. 
8 
range  of  texts,  many  of  which  have  been  written  at  diﬀerent  times  at  in  diﬀerent 
place,  varying  from  the  orthodox  Pali  Canon  to  the  texts  that  the  monk  Saicho 
brought  back  to  Japan  in  the  early  eighth  century,  founding  the  Japanese  school 
of  Tendai  Buddhism  in  the  process.  As  a  result,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  study 
Hume  in  relation  to  the  entirety  of  Buddhist  philosophy.  The  whole  body  of 
texts  is  simply  too  vast  and  complex.  The  main  focus  in  this  study  will  therefore 
be  on  the  Madhyamaka  school  of  Buddhism,  founded  by  the  monk  Nāgārjuna 
(c.  150  –  250  CE).   The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  Madhyamaka  school,  out  of  all 17
the  many  diﬀerent  Buddhist  traditions,  is  commonly  seen  as  having  by  far  the 
strongest  aﬃnities  with  Hume’s  philosophical  ideas.  The  Pyrrhonian  texts,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  arguably  far  easier  to  study,  for  the  simple  reason  that  only 
Sextus  Empiricus’  account  has  survived.   Any  other  Pyrrhonian  texts,  which 18
must  almost  certainly  have  existed,  are  lost  to  us.  This  was  no  diﬀerent  during 
Hume’s  own  time.  
  The  aim  of  this  study  is  not  to  dwell  on  the  degree  of  Hume’s  skepticism, 
and  whether  Hume  was  a  Pyrrhonist,  as  Richard  Popkin  has  advocated 
throughout  his  life,  or  a  moderate,  ‘mitigated’  skeptic.   Nor  is  it  the  aim  of  this 19
study  to  analyse  Hume’s  role  as  a  moral  philosopher.  Rather,  it  looks  at  how 
Hume’s  philosophy  relates  to  key  concepts  from  both  Buddhist  thought  and 
Pyrrhonism,  and  how  Hume  may  have  come  into  contact  with  them  as  a  young 
man.  The  ﬁrst  chapter  focuses  on  Hume’s  denial  of  the  existence  of  independent 
objects  and  the  self,  which  is  where  Hume’s  ideas  apparently  converge  with 
those  from  Buddhist  thought,  and  the  Madhyamaka  school  in  particular.  This 
ﬁrst  chapter  is,  in  other  words,  a  brief  philosophical  inquiry.  This  is  then 
followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  circumstances  during  Hume’s  stay  in  La  Flèche. 
The  third  chapter  focuses  on  Hume’s  debt  to  Pierre  Bayle,  one  of  the 
monumental  ﬁgures  of  the  Enlightenment,  and  how  Bayle  may  have  been  the 
link  between  Hume  and  Buddhism.  Lastly,  The  fourth  and  ﬁnal  chapter  analyses 
Pyrrhonism’s  relation  to  both  Hume  and  Buddhism.  While  it  is  impossible  to 
know  for  certain  whether  Hume  took  concepts  from  Buddhist  or  Pyrrhonian 
philosophy  while  writing  his  Treatise  at  La  Flèche,  a  marriage  of  a  philosophical 
17  Madyamaka’s  main  text  is  the  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā  (Fundamental  Verses  on  the  Middle  Way), 
written  by  Nāgārjuna.  This  study  uses  Jay  Garﬁelds  1995  translation,  see:  Nāgārjuna, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ,  transl.  ed.  Jay  L.  Garﬁeld,  The  Fundamental  Wisdom  of  the  Middle  Way 
(Oxford  1995). 
18  Cicero,  one  of  the  earliest  sources  on  Pyrrho,  does  mention  Pyrrho,  but  the  accuracy  of  his 
account  is  questionable. 
19  See:  Richard  Henry  Popkin,  The  High  Road  to  Pyrrhonism  (Indianapolis  1993). 
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and  a  historical  approach  is  still  the  best,  if  not  the  only  way  to  the  determine 
the  likelihood  of  said  inﬂuences  on  Hume. 
 
   
10 
Hume:  A  Western  Madhyamaka? 
Scholars  have  long  noted  the  remarkable  similarities  between  Hume’s 
philosophical  explorations,  ﬁrst  introduced  in  his  Treatise  of  Human  Nature ,  and 
certain  aspects  of  Buddhist  philosophy.  More  speciﬁcally,  Hume’s  observations 
on  the  nature  of  the  object,  the  self,  and  causation  appear  to  have  much  in 
common  with  Buddhist  thought,  and  the  parallels  between  Hume  and  these 
ancient  philosophical  traditions  are  striking.  As  early  as  1916,  the  Belgian 
Indologist  Louis  de  La  Vallée-Poussin  (1869  –  1939)  noted  how  the  ‘the  theory 
concocted  by  the  yellow-garbed  [Buddhist]  monks  of  yore  agrees  closely  with 
one  of  the  modern  theories  of  the  soul,  the  theory  of  Hume  and  Taine  and 
many  scientists.’    According  to  La  Vallée-Poussin,  the  great  similarity  between 20
the  ‘yellow-garbed  monks  of  yore’  and  Hume  could  be  found  in  their 
perceptions  of  the  self.  Or  rather,  their  conclusion  that  there  is  in  fact  no  self  as 
we  perceive  it.  There  are  no  permanent  feelings,  no  thinking  entity,  no  unity, 
but  rather  an  endless  ﬂow  of  feelings,  emotions,  and  states  of  consciousness.  The 
independent  self  is  merely  a  ﬁction.  All  we  can  truly  perceive  are  natural 
phenomena,  feelings,  wishes  or  wills,  ideas,  states  of  consciousness,  and  the 
body,  which,  like  our  feelings,  is  not  a  static  entity,  but  a  living  thing  that  grows, 
and  decays  over  time.   21
  This  is  what  Buddhists  traditionally  call  Śūnyatā ,  a  Sanskrit  term  which 
can  perhaps  best  be  translated  as  emptiness  into  English.   It  is  arguably  one  of 22
the  central  philosophical  concepts  in  Buddhism,  but  at  the  same  time  also  one 
of  the  most  diﬃcult  to  understand,  and  its  meaning  can  vary  signiﬁcantly 
depending  on  the  doctrinal  context.  In  early  Theravada  Buddhism  it  was 
commonly  used  to  describe  anātman  (Sanskrit)  or  anattā  (Pali):  the  not-self 
nature  of  the  skandhas ,  known  as  the  ﬁve  aggregates  of  sensory  experience  in 
English.   In  the  Pali  canon  these  are  form  (matter),  sensation  (feeling), 23
perception,  mental  formations,  and  consciousness,  and  it  is  through  these  ﬁve 
aggregates  that  the  sentient  being  manifests  itself.  In  the  Theravada  tradition, 
the  world  is  empty  in  the  sense  that  it  is  empty  of  self  or  anything  related  to  the 
20  Louis  de  La  Vallée-Poussin,  The  Way  to  Nirvana:  Six  Lectures  on  Ancient  Buddhism  as  a  Discipline  of 
Salvation,  1916  (Cambridge  1917),  pp.  38-39. 
21  Ibid.,  pp.  38-39 
22  Openness ,   spaciousness ,  voidness  and  vacuity  are  just  some  other  commonly  seen  translations. 
23  No-self  (rather  than  not-self)  is  another  o en  seen  translation  of  anattā ,  but  not-self  is  the  more 
accurate  translation  from  the  original  Pali  according  to  Bronkhorst.  See:  Johannes  Bronkhorst, 
Buddhist  Teaching  in  India   (2009),  p.  124. 
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self.  At  the  same  time,  emptiness  also  refers  to  state  of  consciousness  that  can  only 
be  attained  through  intense  concentration.  Only  by  reaching  this  mental  state 
does  the  individual  realise  the  world  is  free  of  self.  There  is  nothing  besides  what 
already  exists  in  the  present.  24
  There  are  indeed  clear  similarities  between  the  concept  of  the  not-self 
nature  of  sensory  experience  as  recorded  in  the  Pali  canon,  and  Hume’s  own 
position  in  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature .  According  to  Hume,  there  are  some 
philosophers  who  imagine  we  are  every  moment  intimately  conscious  of  what 
we  call  our  self.  However,  there  is  nothing  in  our  sensory  experience  that  would 
actually  validate  such  a  belief.  We  are  never  truly  aware  of  our  self,  only  of  a 
continuous  ﬂow  of  perceptions,  each  replacing  one  another  in  rapid  succession. 
Hume  attempts  to  prove  his  position  by  using  thought  experiments.  For 
example,  in  Volume  I.  of  the  Treatise ,  he  writes: 
 
When  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I  call  myself,  I  always  stumble  on 
some  particular  perception  or  other,  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love 
or  hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never  can  catch  myself  at  any  time  without  a 
perception,  and  never  can  observe  anything  but  the  perception.   25
 
He  goes  on,  famously  stating: 
 
The  mind  is  a  kind  of  theatre,  where  several  perceptions  successively 
make  their  appearance;  pass,  re-pass,  glide  away,  and  mingle  in  an  inﬁnite 
variety  of  postures  and  situations.  There  is  properly  no  simplicity  in  it  at 
one  time,  nor  identity  in  diﬀerent;  whatever  natural  propension  we  may 
have  to  imagine  that  simplicity  and  identity.  The  comparison  of  the 
theatre  must  not  mislead  us.  They  are  the  successive  perceptions  only, 
that  constitute  the  mind;  nor  have  we  the  most  distant  notion  of  the 
place,  where  these  scenes  are  represented,  or  of  the  materials,  of  which  it 
is  compos’d.  26
 
However,  while  emptiness  in  the  earliest  Buddhist  texts  refers  to  a  world  free  of 
self,  Hume’s  idea  of  emptiness  is  more  far-reaching.  In  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature , 
24  See:  The  Collection  of  the  Middle-Length  Savings  (Majjhima  Nikaya) ,  transl.  I.  B.  Horner  (London 
1957)  vol.  1,  sec.  233. 
25  David  Hume,  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  (London  1739),  p.  252. 
26  Ibid.,  p.  253. 
12 
Hume  not  only  denies  the  existence  of  the  self,  he  also  claims  the  existence  of 
substance  can  not  be  derived  from  the  senses.   A er  all,  we  can  see  colour,  hear 27
sound,  we  can  use  our  sense  of  taste  and  smell,  but  we  cannot  sense  substance. 
While  for  an  atomist  atoms  are  what  make  up  substance,  in  Hume’s  world 
substances  consist  of  impressions  and  ideas,  and  our  impressions  of  a  substance, 
in  turn,  are  derived  solely  from  the  qualities  we  attribute  to  that  particular 
substance.  Hume  illustrates  this  in  Volume  I.  of  the  Treatise   by  using  the 
example  of  gold:   
 
Thus  our  idea  of  gold  may  at  ﬁrst  be  a  yellow  colour,  weight, 
malleableness,  fusibility;  but  upon  the  discovery  of  its  dissolubility  in 
aqua  regia ,  we  join  that  to  the  other  qualities,  and  suppose  it  to  belong  to 
the  substance  as  much  as  if  its  idea  had  from  the  beginning  made  a  part 
of  the  compound  one.  28
 
In  other  words,  when  thinking  of  gold,  humans  have  a  natural  tendency  to  also 
think  about  its  colour,  weight,  malleableness,  fusibility  or  one  of  gold’s  many 
other  properties.  Hume,  however,  argues  that  none  of  these  traits  are  inherent  in 
the  gold  itself.  Rather,  the  piece  of  gold  is  a  collection  of  its  properties,  and  while 
we  can  sense  these  individual  properties,  the  collection  of  traits  that  we  call  gold 
is  merely  a  product  of  the  imagination.   To  use  Hume’s  own  words  again,  ‘the 29
term  of  unity  is  merely  a  ﬁctitious  denomination,  which  the  mind  may  apply  to 
any  quantity  of  objects  it  collects  together.’   30
  While  Hume’s  radical  skepticism  diverges  signiﬁcantly  from  Theravada 
tradition,  his  view  on  the  independent  existence  of  objects  shows  striking 
similarities  with  another  school  of  Buddhism:  Madhyamaka.   Founded  by  the 31
great  Buddhist  reformer  Nāgārjuna  (c.  150  –  250  CE),  it  is  one  of  the  two  main 
schools  within  the  Buddhist  Mahāyāna  tradition,   and  the  one  that  has  arguably 32
27  Hume’s  views  on  substance  in  fact  precede  his  views  on  personal  identity  in  the  Treatise.  As  a 
result,  Hume’s  views  on  substance  and  personal  identity  are  o en  treated  separately  in 
philosophical  analysis  of  his  work.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  strong  case  for  interpreting  Hume’s 
ideas  on  personal  identity  as  the  logical  result  of  his  views  on  substance.  See  also:  Nathan 
Robert  Cox,  Substance  and  Skepticism  in  Hume’s  Treatise  (Kansas  2011). 
28  Hume,  Treatise ,  p.  16 
29  Hume  does  not  seem  to  take  into  account  the  role  of  language. 
30  Hume,  Treatise ,  p.  30. 
31  Literally:  Middlemost.  A  Madhyamaka  is  an  individual  who  takes  the  ‘middlemost’  way  in 
philosophy. 
32  Literally:  the  Great  Vehicle.  Mahāyāna  Buddhism  is  nowadays  the  largest  and  most  diverse  of 
the  three  major  branches  of  Buddhism,  with  over  50%  of  practitioners  adhering  to  one  of  the 
many  schools  of  Mahāyāna  thought. 
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developed  the  most  skeptical  worldview.  In  an  attempt  to  oppose  the 
essentialism  of  the  early  Buddhist  Abhidharma  texts  (third  century  BC), 
Nāgārjuna  further  developed  the  concept  of  Śūnyata .   According  to  Nāgārjuna, 33
worldly  objects  are  not  just  free  of  self:  they  are  inherently  empty.  Dharmas  or 
‘things’,  do  exist,  but,  paradoxically,  only  in  the  sense  that  there  is  nothing  innate 
in  them.  They  lack  any  kind  of  substance  or  essence  (Sanskrit:  svabhāva ).  But  even 
that  emptiness  is  in  itself  empty,  since,  like  all  other  phenomena,  emptiness  has 
no  inherent  existence.  It  does  not  even  exist  on  the  metaphysical  level,  that  is, 
the  ‘world’  beyond  the  capacities  of  human  sensory  experience.  Rather, 
emptiness  simply  manifests  itself  in  all  natural  phenomena.  
  The  Madhyamaka  world  view  can  further  be  explained  by  how  it 
distinguishes  between  two  fundamental  levels  of  truth,  known  as  two  truths 
doctrine  ( satyadvayavibhāga) .  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  conventional  truth 
( loka-samvriti-satya) ,  sometimes  also  known  as  commonsensical  or  relative  truth. 
This  ﬁrst  level  of  truth  is  the  directly  perceivable  or  phenomenal  world,  and, 
according  to  Nāgārjuna,  it  is  the  only  reality  that  actually  exists.  It  is  here  where 
all  phenomena  manifest  themselves.  However,  the  conventional  truth  conceals  a 
second  level  of  truth,  which  Nāgārjuna  calls  the  ultimate  truth  ( paramarthika 
satya) .  This  ultimate  truth  is  the  realisation  that  everything  is  empty,  even 
emptiness  itself.  Paradoxically,  Nāgārjuna’s  ultimate  truth  is  that  there  is  no 
ultimate  truth.  34
  Nāgārjuna’s  argument  rests  on  the  Buddhist  concept  of  dependent 
origination  ( Pratītyasamutpāda) .  In  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā  24:18,  the  key  text  of  the 
Madhyamaka  school,  he  writes: 
 
Whatever  is  dependently  co-arisen 
That  is  explained  to  be  emptiness. 
That,  being  a  dependent  designation 
Is  itself  the  middle  way. 
Something  that  is  not  dependently  arisen  
Such  a  thing  does  not  exist. 
Therefore  a  non-empty  thing 
33  Joseph  Wasler,  Nagarjuna  in  Context  (New  York  2005),  pp..  225-263 
34  Mark  Siderits,  "On  the  Soteriological  Signiﬁcance  of  Emptiness",  Contemporary  Buddhism  4  (1) 
(2003),  p.  11. 
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Does  not  exist.   35
 
By  this  he  means  that  every  ‘thing’  ( dharma)  does  not  exist  independently,  but 
depends  on  other  ‘things’.  A er  all,  if  ‘things’  had  any  innate  substance  or 
essence,  they  must  always  have  existed  and  will  continue  to  exist  for  eternity, 
something  that  is  incompatible  with  the  conventional  truth.  No,  Nāgārjuna 
argues,  every  single  ‘thing’  only  exists  because  it  has  been  caused  by  something 
else.  And  because  everything  is  dependently  originated  and  has  no  inherent 
essence,  everything  must  be  empty.  Therefore,  dependent  origination  can  be 
equated  with  emptiness.   36
  What  makes  the  similarities  between  Hume  and  Nāgārjuna  so  striking,  is 
that  despite  being  separated  by  vast  distances  of  space  and  time,  they  both 
essentially  use  the  same  thought  process  to  reach  the  same  conclusion. 
Moreover,  the  two  philosophers  do  not  deny  the  existence  of  substance  entirely. 
While  Hume  does  vehemently  disagree  with  the  commonly  held  idea  of  innate 
substance,  he  does,  like  Nāgārjuna,  accept  the  existence  of  objects  on  the 
conventional  level,  in  other  words,  in  the  directly  perceivable  world.  But  when 
one  attempts  to  look  beyond  human  sensory  experience,  one  merely  ﬁnds 
emptiness.  In  the  end,  both  Hume  and  Nāgārjuna  reach  the  same  conclusion: 
the  ultimate  truth  is  that  there  is  no  ultimate  truth  beyond  the  perceivable 
world. 
  Still,  the  apparent  similarities  between  Hume  and  Nāgārjuna  are  not 
undisputed.  Edward  Conze,  an  Anglo-German  scholar  known  for  his  pioneering 
translations  of  Buddhist  texts,  argues  that  in  our  search  for  parallels  between 
diﬀerent  philosophical  traditions  we  o en  overlook  their  fundamental 
diﬀerences.   Scholars  are  o en  so  desperate  to  ﬁnd  aﬃnities  between  diﬀerent 37
thinkers,  either  because  of  the  desire  to  conﬁrm  their  own  hypothesis,  or 
because  they  feel  the  need  to  impress  their  colleagues,  they  lose  sight  of 
everything  else  in  the  process.  Conze  makes  the  argument  that  while  ‘Hume’s 
denial  of  self  seems  to  literally  agree  with  the  anattā  [not-self]  doctrine [.  .  .] 
‘Hume  reduced  self-hood  to  the  level  of  the  sub-personal,  [whereas]  the 
35  Nāgārjuna,  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā ,  transl.  ed.  Jay  L.  Garﬁeld,  The  Fundamental  Wisdom  of  the 
Middle  Way  (Oxford  1995),  p.  304. 
36  Geshe  Sonam  Rinchen.  How  Karma  Works:  The  Twelve  Links  of  Dependent  Arising  (Ithaca,  New  York 
2006),  p.  21. 
37  For  Conze’s  full  argument,  see:  Edward  Conze,  ‘Spurious  Parallels  to  Buddhist  Philosophy,’ 
Philosophy  East  and  West  13  (2)  (1963),  pp.  105–115. 
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Buddhist  doctrine  of  anattā  invites  us  to  search  for  the  super-personal.’   In  other 38
words,  whereas  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  anattā  leads  to  a  positive  quest  for 
liberation,  Hume  eschewed  any  search  for  the  transcendental.  Instead,  he  turned 
to  a  form  of  nihilism,  which  Buddhism  rejects.  Thus,  while  Hume  and  Buddhist 
theory  are  in  agreement  in  their  denial  of  the  substantial  self,  their  respective 
attitudes  towards  the  positive  self  stand  in  contrast  to  each  other.  Conze’s 
critique  is  both  valid  and  important,  but  the  fact  that  Hume  and  Nāgārjuna  deny 
the  self  for  wholly  diﬀerent  reasons  does  not  refute  the  claim  that  Hume  was 
inﬂuenced  by  Buddhist  ideas.  A er  all,  being  inﬂuenced  by  someone  does  not 
automatically  imply  sharing  the  same  goals  and  methods.  In  fact,  that  would  be 
highly  unusual,  not  only  because  it  is  possible  to  be  critical  of  previous  ideas  but 
still  be  inﬂuenced  by  those  same  ideas,  but  also  because  even  where  there  is 
agreement  ideas  tend  to  change  with  every  subsequent  interpretation.  Since 
there  is  little  reason  to  assume  that  Hume  ever  read  original  Buddhist  texts, 
philosopher  Yumiko  Inukai  makes  the  argument  that  exactly  because  Hume’s 
ultimate  goal,  that  is,  knowledge,  diﬀers  from  the  Buddhist  end  goal,  liberation, 
their  shared  denial  of  the  substantial  self  becomes  all  the  more  striking.   39
  Thus,  while  Hume  is  certainly  not  a  Madhyamaka  in  the  literal  sense,  one 
could  argue  that  his  denial  of  substance  forms  a  Western  counterpart  to 
Madhyamaka  Buddhism.  Others  have  reached  the  same  conclusion.  For 
example,  Jay  Garﬁeld  recalls  how  his  experience  from  ‘teaching  Hume  at 
Tibetan  universities  in  India  is  that  Tibetan  scholars  instantly  recognize  him  as 
‘a  kind  of  Madhyamaka.’’   And  for  good  reason:  as  the  the  Indian  Madhyamaka 40
scholar  Tirupattur  Ramaseshayyer  Venkatachala  Murthi  once  remarked,  ‘the 
denial  of  substance  is  the  foundation  of  Buddhism  down  the  ages.’  41
   
38  Conze,  ‘Spurious  Parallels’,  pp.  113-114. 
39  Inukai,  ‘The  World  of  the  Vulgar’,  pp.  621-622. 
40  Jay  Garﬁeld,  Hume  as  a  Western  Mādhyamika:  The  Case  from  Ethics  (2015),  p.  1 
41  Tirupattur  Ramaseshayyer  Venkatachala  Murthi,  The  Central  Philosophy  of  Buddhism  (London 
1960),  pp.  26-27. 
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The  Mystery  of  the  La  Flèche  Period  (1734-1737) 
Even  today,  nearly  300  years  a er  it  was  ﬁrst  published,  and  despite  having 
become  part  of  the  ‘Western  philosophical  canon’,  Hume’s  Treatise  is  still 
shrouded  in  mystery.  Much  of  that  mystery  has  to  do  with  Hume’s  personal 
circumstances  at  the  time.  The  Treatise  was  his  ﬁrst  major  work,  and  when  Hume 
began  working  on  it  he  was  still  only  a  25  year  old  student.  He  had  no  steady 
income,  no  learned  profession,  and  was  virtually  unknown  to  the  wider  world. 
The  unfortunate  result  of  that  obscurity  is  that  we  still  know  only  very  little 
about  Hume’s  early  life.  We  know  he  travelled  to  La  Flèche  in  Anjou,  France  at 
the  age  of  25  in  1735,  where  he  stayed  until  1737,  and  we  know  that  he  was  in  a 
precarious  ﬁnancial  situation,  but  other  than  that  we  know  very  little  about  the 
years  he  spent  in  France  as  a  young  man.  
  While  many  of  Hume’s  later  letters  have  been  preserved  and  widely 
published,  letters  from  his  early  years  are  virtually  non-existent.  Even  if  they  do 
exist,  they  have  not  yet  been  discovered,  and  likely  never  will  be.  Only  four 
letters  from  his  time  in  France  have  survived,  and  only  a  single  letter  from  his 
time  at  La  Flèche,  which,  other  than  mentioning  the  civility  of  the  people  and 
the  prestige  of  the  local  Jesuit  College,  does  not  reveal  much  else.  Much  of  what 
we  do  know  about  Hume’s  life  during  this  period  stems  from  later  accounts,  and 
even  these  provide  us  with  only  very  little  information.  Not  even  the  fact  that 
Descartes,  who  became  the  target  of  much  of  Hume’s  criticism,  graduated  from 
La  Flèche  a  century  earlier  is  ever  mentioned  by  Hume  in  his  writings,  his 
personal  letters  included.    In  any  case,  he  seems  to  have  had  fond  memories  of 42
his  time  in  France.  In  his  rather  brief  autobiography  My  Own  Life ,  written  just 
months  before  his  death  in  1776,  he  mentions  ‘passing  three  years  very  agreeably 
in  that  country  [France].’   43
  Our  best  source  of  information  is  a  single  letter,  written  decades  a er 
Hume’s  departure  from  La  Flèche.  In  this  letter,  dated  1762,  Hume  responds  to 
George  Campbell  (1719  –  1796),  a  prominent  Scottish  minister,  philosopher,  and 
professor  of  divinity,  who  disagreed  with  Hume’s  attack  on  miracles.  Hume 
writes: 
 
42  John  Hill  Burton,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  David  Hume,  Volume  I  (Edinburgh  1846),  p.  58  . 
43  David  Hume,  My  Own  Life ,  April  18  1776. 
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It  may  perhaps  amuse  you  to  learn  the  ﬁrst  hint,  which  suggested  to  me 
that  argument  which  you  have  so  strenuously  attacked.  I  was  walking  in 
the  cloisters  of  the  Jesuits'  College  of  La  Flêche,  a  town  in  which  I  passed 
two  years  of  my  youth,  and  engaged  in  a  conversation  with  a  Jesuit  of 
some  parts  and  learning,  who  was  relating  to  me,  and  urging  some 
nonsensical  miracle  performed  lately  in  their  convent,  when  I  was 
tempted  to  dispute  against  him;  and  as  my  head  was  full  of  the  topics  of 
my  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  which  I  was  at  that  time  composing,  this 
argument  immediately  occurred  to  me,  and  I  thought  it  very  much 
gravelled  my  companion;  but  at  last  he  observed  to  me,  that  it  was 
impossible  for  that  argument  to  have  any  solidity,  because  it  operated 
equally  against  the  Gospel  as  the  Catholic  miracles;—which  observation  I 
thought  proper  to  admit  as  a  suﬃcient  answer.  I  believe  you  will  allow, 
that  the  freedom  at  least  of  this  reasoning  makes  it  somewhat 
extraordinary  to  have  been  the  produce  of  a  convent  of  Jesuits,  though 
perhaps  you  may  think  the  sophistry  of  it  savours  plainly  of  the  place  of 
its  birth.  44
 
From  this  letter,  we  know  Hume  appears  to  have  engaged  in  conversation  with 
at  least  one  Jesuit  ‘of  some  parts  and  learning’  at  La  Flèche,  or  rather,  we  know 
that  he  claims  to  have  engaged  in  conversation  with  a  Jesuit  of  some  parts  and 
learning.  The  general  tone  of  the  letter  can  only  be  described  as  dismissive,  but 
that  may  be,  as  Gopnik  argues,  because  he  was  writing  to  a  Protestant  minister 
who  disputed  Hume’s  argument  against  miracles  in  An  Enquiry  Concerning 
Human  Understanding  (1748).   By  using  a  Jesuit  as  an  example,  Hume  cunningly 45
forced  the  Protestant  Campbell  to  either  defend  a  Catholic  Jesuit  or  dismiss  his 
own  argument.  
  Gopnik  then  asks  herself:  ‘Who  did  Hume  talk  to?  Who  might  be 
candidates  for  the  Jesuit  “of  some  parts  and  learning”?’  She  notes  there  were  34 
oﬃcial  Jesuit  fathers  at  La  Flèche  in  1734,  and  40  in  1737,  out  of  which  8  were 
ex-missionaries,  and  an  even  greater  number  of  students,  servants  and 
assistants.  The  most  most  interesting  individual,  she  concludes,  was  an  elderly 
ex-missionary  named  Charles  François  Dolu  (1655  –  1740).  Dolu  was  one  of  only 
44
  Dated  7th  January,  1762,  and  written  in  relation  to  a  copy  of  Campbell's  "Dissertation  on 
Miracles,"  sent  to  him  by  Dr.  Blair. 
45  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  pp.  8-9. 
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fourteen  Jesuits  who  travelled  to  Siam,  and  shortly  a er  taking  is  vows  as 
spiritual  coadjutor  in  1687  he  joined  the  French  embassy  to  the  Siamese  King 
Narai.  Unfortunately  for  the  French  mission  in  Siam,  however,  the  pro-French 
King  Narai  was  overthrown  only  a  year  later  in  an  anti-foreign  coup  supported 
by  the  Dutch.  Contacts  with  the  French  were  severed,  and  a er  the  expulsion  of 
all  Europeans  from  Siam  Dolu  ﬂed  to  Pondicherry,  the  French  headquarters  in 
India,  where  he  remained  until  around  1710.  In  1713  he  accompanied  the 
Duchess  of  Alba  to  Spain,  before  ultimately  retiring  to  La  Flèche  in  1723,  where 
he  remained  until  his  death  in  1740. 
  So  why  Dolu?  According  to  Gopnik,  Dolu  was  intelligent,  knowledgeable, 
and  gregarious.  He  was  interested  in  science  and  natural  history,  composed 
music,  worked  closely  with  other  Jesuits,  some  of  whom  were  distinguished 
mathematicians  and  astronomers,  and  in  1715  even  became  a  member  of  the 
Academie  de  Lyons,  a  group  of  intellectuals  centered  around  Seigneur  François 
Bottu  de  la  Barmondière  Saint  Fonds  (1675  –  1739),  a  French  nobleman.  During 
his  stay  in  Pondicherry,  Dolu  also  worked  closely  together  with  Jean  Venance 
Bouchet,  the  superior  of  the  French  mission  in  India,  who  was  noted  for 
adopting  Hindu  dress  and  vegetarianism.  Moreover,  Dolu  was  involved  in  the 
Malabar  rites  controversy,  a  debate  between  the  Jesuits  and  the  more  orthodox 
Cupuchins  over  the  incorporation  of  native  religious  customs  into  Christian 
missionary  rites.   Considering  Dolu’s  apparent  open-mindedness,  and  above 46
all,  wit,  Gopnik  concludes  that  ‘it  is  diﬃcult  not  to  believe  that  they  [Hume  and 
Dolu]  would  have  enjoyed  each  other’s  conversation  during  Hume’s  crucial  two 
years  at  La  Flèche.’  47
  Indeed,  Hume  was  himself  known  as  a  gregarious,  warm,  open-minded 
and  intellectually  curious  person  throughout  his  life,  and  would  likely  have 
gotten  along  with  someone  of  a  similar  disposition.  In  his  classic  biography  of 
David  Hume,  Ernest  Campbell  Mossner  writes: 
 
The  French  learned  to  call  him  le  bon  David ,  but  the  epithet  cannot  be 
readily  translated  into  one  English  word.  To  call  Hume  good  would  be 
misleading,  for  he  was  certainly  no  saint.  In  many  ways,  however,  he 
was  good:  he  was  humane,  charitable,  paciﬁc,  tolerant,  and 
encouraging  of  others,  morally  sincere  and  intellectually  honest.  He 
46  Ibid.,  pp.  10-13. 
47  Ibid.,  p.  13. 
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was  always  a  loyal  friend.  He  was,  however,  somewhat  inclined  to  be 
jealous  –  jealous  of  his  own  reputation,  jealous  of  the  integrity  of 
friendship,  jealous  of  the  prestige  of  his  native  country.  Intellectually  a 
citizen  of  the  world,  he  was  emotionally  a  Scot  of  Scots.  He  was, 
moreover,  a  worldly  man  who  thoroughly  enjoyed  the  good  things  of 
life  –  food  and  drink,  wit,  conversation,  rational  discourse.  48
 
So,  can  we  therefore  assume  Hume  did  indeed  engage  in  conversation  with 
Charles  Francois  Dolu,  one  of  the  oldest,  most  learned,  and  wide-travelled 
Jesuits  at  the  Royal  Jesuit  College  of  La  Flèche?  The  short  answer  is  ‘no’,  we 
cannot.  First  of  all,  Gopnik’s  entire  argument  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
Hume’s  letter  to  Campbell  is  truthful.  However,  we  cannot  simply  assume  that  it 
is.  Not  only  was  the  letter  written  decades  a er  Hume’s  experiences  as  a  student 
in  France;  he  was  also  writing  with  a  speciﬁc  goal  in  mind,  that  is,  to  place 
Campbell  in  the  uncomfortable  position  of  either  having  to  defend  a  Jesuit  or 
agree  with  Hume’s  argument  against  ‘nonsensical  miracles’.  On  the  one  hand 
Gopnik  accepts  Hume’s  claim  that  he  engaged  in  conversation  with  a  Jesuit,  but 
on  the  other  hand  she  doubts  the  sincerity  of  his  dismissive  attitude  towards 
Jesuits.  Hume  may  just  as  well  have  invented  the  story  to  reinforce  his  own 
position  in  relation  to  Campbell. 
  Even  if  we  accept  that  the  conversation  did  take  place,  we  still  do  not 
know  whether  the  conversation  was  just  an  isolated  event,  or  whether  Hume 
frequently  intermingled  with  the  Jesuits  of  La  Flèche.  While  it  is  true  that  Hume 
lived  only  a  short  walk  away  from  the  Jesuit  college  and  almost  certainly  made 
use  of  its  extensive  library  of  some  40,000  books,   it  is  important  to  note  that 49
he  never  lived  on  the  actual  college  grounds,  nor  was  he  ever  part  of  the  college. 
In  short,  we  know  almost  nothing  about  the  frequency  or  the  nature  of  his 
interactions  with  the  Jesuits.  Dolu  was  certainly  an  interesting  individual,  but  it 
seems  arbitrary  to  select  him  as  ‘the  most  likely  candidate’.  Assuming  that  Hume 
and  Dolu  did  indeed  engage  in  frequent  conversation,  we  still  do  not  have  a 
single  clue  about  the  nature  of  their  conversations.  Did  they  discuss  Buddhism? 
We  simply  do  not  know.  Although  Dolu  le   behind  letters,   he  makes  no 50
48  Ernest  Campbell  Mossner,  The  Life  of  David  Hume  (Oxford  1980),  p.  4. 
49  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  p.  8. 
50  See:  ‘Lettre  du  Père  Dolu,  Missionaire  de  la  Compagnie  de  Jésus,  au  Père  le  Gobien  de  la  même 
Compagine’,  in  Lettres  édi antes  et  curieuses:  Mémoires  des  Indes ,  Vol.  10 ,  pp.  138-142. 
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mention  of  Buddhist  doctrine  in  his  writings,  and  while  he  undoubtedly  learned 
about  Buddhism,  we  do  not  know  how  intricate  his  knowledge  of  Buddhism 
really  was.  Remember,  Dolu  spent  only  a  year  in  Siam  before  the  French 
missionaries  were  expelled.  Learning  new  languages  within  such  a  short 
timespan  is  hard  enough,  let  alone  the  many  complexities  of  Buddhism,  even 
with  the  valuable  help  of  French  colleagues  like  Jean  Venance  Bouchet.  
  However,  Gopnik  argues  that  Dolu  had  another  major  source  of 
information  on  Buddhism.  That  source  was  Father  Ippoliti  Desideri,  a  Tuscan 
Jesuit  who  spent  ﬁve  years  of  his  life  in  Tibet  between  1716  –  1721.  Not  only  was 
Desideri  the  ﬁrst  European  to  master  the  Tibetan  language;  he  also  took 
extensive  notes  on  Tibetan  religion  and  culture,  which  he  eventually  compiled 
in  a  monumental  series  of  manuscripts.  Desideri  spent  much  of  his  ﬁve  years  in 
Tibet  in  some  of  the  country’s  great  mountain  monasteries,  where  he  composed 
works  in  literary  Tibetan.  In  a  typically  Jesuit  manner  he  attempted  to  refute 
Buddhist  concepts  such  as  rebirth  and  emptiness,  which  he  considered  to  be  at 
odds  with  the  two  minimum  requirements  of  Christian  faith —belief  in  God  and 
belief  in  providence— while  accepting  parts  of  Buddhist  moral  philosophy  that 
were  deemed  to  be  compatible.   Unfortunately,  although  Desideri’s  manuscripts 51
were  arguably  the  most  comprehensive  and  accurate  descriptions  of  Tibet  and 
Buddhism  before  the  20th  century,  he  was  banned  from  publishing  his 
manuscripts  by  the  Propaganda  order,  and  they  disappeared  into  the  Jesuit 
archives  in  Rome  and  a  private  collection  until  their  sudden  rediscovery  in  the 
late  19th  century.  52
  What  connects  Desideri  to  Dolu  is  the  fact  that  the  two  learned  men  met 
each  other  at  La  Flèche  in  1727  when  the  former  spent  some  time  in  France 
during  his  journey  back  to  Rome  from  Pondicherry.   Desideri  writes: 53
 
‘On  the  31st  (August)  around  noon  I  arrived  at  our  Royal  College  at  La 
Flèche.  There  I  received  the  particular  attention  of  the  rector,  the 
51  Trent  Pomplun,  Jesuit  on  the  Roof  of  the  World :  Ippolito  Desideri's  Mission  to  Tibet  (New  York  2010), 
p.  12. 
52  Pomplun,  Desideri’s  Mission ,  pp.  3-4. 
53   Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  p.  14,  translated  from  Luciano  Petech,  I  Missionary , 
Volume  7,  p.  94:  ‘31  del  medesimo  mese  doppo  il  mezzo  de  giorno  arrivai  al  nostro  Real 
Collegio  della  citta  della  Flèche,  Quivi  speciali  ricevei  i  favori  dal  R.P.  Rettore,  dal  R.P  . 
Procurator,  dal  R.  P.  Tolu  e  da  qualche  altro  di  quei  RR  PP.  A  4  di  Septembre  partij  dalla  Flèche.’ 
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procurator,  Père  Tolu  [Dolu]  and  several  other  of  the  reverend  fathers. 
On  the  4th  I  le   La  Flèche.’ 
 
As  Gopnik  notes,  it  is  noteworthy  that  Desideri  speciﬁcally  mentions  Dolu,  but 
not  the  other  fathers.  Indeed,  Desideri  and  Dolu  seem  to  have  had  several  things 
in  common:  both  knew  Jean  Venance  Bouchet,  the  superior  of  the  French 
mission  in  Pondicherry,  both  had  experienced  their  own  respective  struggles 
with  the  more  orthodox  Capuchins  over  native  religious  rites,  and  they  both 
shared  a  deep  commitment  to  the  evangelization  of  Asia.   Moreover,  Desideri 54
likely  carried  with  him  a  fairly  complete  manuscript  of  the  groundbreaking 
book  on  Tibet  he  was  working  on.   He  could  quickly  have  copied  his 55
manuscript  at  La  Flèche,  which  had  its  own  printing  press,  or  sent  a  revised 
version  to  La  Flèche  when  he  got  back  to  Rome.  
  While  such  a  thought  is  certainly  fascinating,  there  is  nevertheless  too 
little  evidence  to  claim  that  Desideri  shared  some  of  his  unique  knowledge  of 
Tibetan  Buddhism  with  Dolu.  Desideri  spent  only  several  days  at  La  Flèche 
during  a  long —and  likely  exhausting — journey  from  Pondicherry.  Although  he 
probably  mentioned  his  experiences  in  Tibet  to  some  of  the  Jesuits,  it 
is — contrary  to  what  Gopnik  claims — far  from  certain  that  Desideri  discussed 
Buddhist  doctrine  with  Dolu  during  his  short  stay  at  La  Flèche.  Even  his 
statement  that  when  he  ‘returned  through  France  and  Italy  to  Tuscany  and 
Rome’  he  ‘was  strongly  urged  by  many  men  of  letters,  by  gentlemen  and  by 
important  personages  to  write  down  in  proper  order  all’  he  ‘had  told  them  at 
diﬀerent  times’   only  tells  us  very  little.  Desideri  made  not  just  a  stop  at  La 56
Flèche;  he  also  stopped  at  several  other  Jesuit  establishments  in  France,  namely 
in  Vannes  and  Rennes.  He  was  then  detained  in  Mans  for  several  days,  before 
arriving  in  Paris  on  September  12th,  where  he  remained  until  the  28th.   In  Paris 57
he  met  with  other  Jesuits,  but  also  aristocrats,  the  Tuscan  ambassador,  the  papal 
nuncio,  Cardinal  de  Fleury,  gave  his  blessings  to  two  royal  princesses,  and  was 
even  admitted  to  the  presence  of  King  Louis  XV  himself.   Unfortunately,  since 58
Desideri  never  wrote  down  the  content  of  his  conversations  in  France,  the 
54  Ibid.,  p.  15. 
55  Mission  to  Tibet:  The  Extraordinary  Eighteenth-Century  Account  of  Father  Ippolito  Desideri  S.J. ,  transl. 
Michael  Sweet,  ed.  Leonard  Zwilling  (Boston  2010),  pp.  81-82. 
56  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  pp.  15-16. 
57  Sweet,  Zwilling,  Mission  to  Tibet ,  pp.  74-76. 
58  Ibid.,  pp.  74-76. 
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answer  as  to  which  of  these  ‘men  of  letters,  gentlemen,  and  important 
personages’  urged  him  to  ‘write  down  in  proper  all  he  had  told  them  at  diﬀerent 
times’  remains  a  mystery.  
  All  we  know  for  certain  is  that  Dolu  took  Desideri  in  his  care  in  August 
1727  and  that  Desideri  speciﬁcally  mentions  Dolu.  And  while  he  may  well  have 
provided  the  Jesuits  at  La  Flèche  with  a  copy  of  his  manuscript,  this — let  alone 
the  notion  that  Hume  would  have  had  access  to  such  a  copy — remains  pure 
speculation.  No  French  copy  has  ever  been  discovered,  and  until  one  emerges  it 
seems  unlikely  that  either  Dolu  or  Hume  ever  had  access  to  a  copy  of  Desideri’s 
manuscript. 
  Even  Gopnik  concedes  that  it  is  ‘is  more  likely  [.  .  .]  that  Hume  would 
have  heard  about  Desideri’s  discoveries  through  conversation.’   More  likely, 59
perhaps,  but  still  far  from  certain.  Remember,  Hume  arrived  in  France  only  in 
1737,  a  full  decade  a er  Desideri  enjoyed  the  Jesuits’  hospitality  at  La  Flèche. 
Even  the  fact  that,  besides  Dolu,  eleven  other  fathers  who  had  been  present 
during  Desideri’s  visit  were  still  there  when  Hume  came  to  La  Flèche  in  1737 
tells  us  almost  nothing.  It  rests  on  the  assumption  that  Hume  spoke  at  some 
length  with  Jesuits  who  would  have  remembered  Desideri,  that  these  Jesuits  had 
received  considerable  information  from  Desideri  on  Tibet  and  on  Tibetan 
Buddhism  more  speciﬁcally  during  a  period  of  just  several  days,  and  that  they 
would  have  been  particularly  eager  to  share  this  information  with  Hume.  
    One  can  also  wonder  why  Desideri  is  even  necessary  as  a  source  when 
Dolu  was  apparently  already  knowledgeable  on  Buddhist  philosophy.  The 
answer  probably  lies  in  the  general  doctrinal  diﬀerences  between  Theravada 
Buddhism  and  Tibetan  Buddhism.  As  we  have  seen,  Hume’s  philosophy  of 
substance  shows  considerably  more  convergence  with  Madhyamaka  than  with 
Theravada  Buddhism,  where  the  notion  of  not-self  is  not  as  clearly  articulated. 
Tibetan  Buddhism,  in  turn,  was  heavily  inﬂuenced  by  the  philosophy  of  the 
earlier  Madhyamaka  reformers.  Not  only  does  the  Gelug  school  of  Tibetan 
Buddhism,  founded  by  the  great  reformer  Tsongkhapa  ( 1357–1419)  incorporate 
Madhyamaka  notions  of  emptiness  and  dependent  arising,   but  Desideri  also 60
closely  followed  Tsongkhapa’s  philosophy  when  he  was  writing  his  manuscripts 
on  Tibetan  religion.  Although  he  struggled  to  grasp  the  concept  of  emptiness  at 
59  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  p  18. 
60  Tsongkhapa’s  explanation  of  Madhyamaka  has  in  fact  become  standard  in  the  West,  see:  Karl 
Brunnhölzl,  The  Center  of  the  Sunlit  Sky:  Madhyamaka  in  the  Kagyu  Tradition  (2004),  p.17. 
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ﬁrst,  Śūnyatā  being  ‘ so  abstruse  a  concept  that  he  could  not  ﬁnd  a  teacher  at  Sera 
to  explain  it  to  him’,  he  eventually  used  Gelug  logic  and  terminology  to  defend 
his  own  Christian  theology.   61
  Another  major  issue  with  Gopnik’s  hypothesis  is  that  Hume  never 
mentions  Buddhism  in  any  of  his  writings,  or  at  least  those  that  have  survived. 
Gopnik  attributes  this  to  source  amnesia.  She  states  that  ‘even  if  Hume  was 
inﬂuenced  by  ideas  that  came  from  Buddhism  through  discussions  with  Dolu, 
he  probably  would  not  have  tracked  or  remembered  exactly  which  foreign 
culture,  India,  China  or  Siam,  was  the  original  source  of  these  ideas,  or  perhaps 
even  that  they  had  come  from  that  source  at  all.’   While  source  amnesia  is 62
indeed  not  unknown,  common  even,  Gopnik’s  reasoning  here  runs  counter  to 
the  rest  of  her  argument.  Her  entire  case  rests  on  the  idea  that  Dolu  was  a 
learned,  wide-travelled  Jesuit  who  would  have  loved  to  share  his  unique 
experiences  as  a  missionary  in  Asia,  as  well  as  what  he  learned  from  Desideri 
about  Tibet  with  Hume.  It  seems  highly  unlikely  that  Dolu  would  have  shared 
Buddhist  doctrine,  which  was  widely  associated  with  atheism  at  the  time  and 
condemned  by  even  the  most  tolerant  of  Jesuits,   without  explicitly  mentioning 63
the  source.  If  anything,  exotic  sources  like  Siam  and  Tibet—or  simply 
Asia—would  have  been  particularly  memorable  to  a  young  student  like  Hume.  
   
61  Sweet,  Zwilling,  Mission  to  Tibet ,  p.  63. 
62  Gopnik,  ‘Could  David  Hume  Have  Known’,  p  19. 
63  Thierry  Meynard,  ‘Chinese  Buddhism  and  the  Threat  of  Atheism  in  Seventeenth-Century 
Europe’,  Buddhist-Christian  Studies  31  (2011),  p.  13. 
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Pierre  Bayle:  The  Crucial  Link? 
If  Hume  was  at  all  inﬂuenced  by  Buddhist  ideas,  the  most  likely  sources  are  not 
Dolu  or  Desideri,  but  texts  from  earlier  authors  that  Hume  was  almost  certainly 
familiar  with.  In  an  early  letter  to  his  friend  Michael  Ramsay,  dated  August  26th 
1737,  Hume  writes  that  ‘to  comprehend  the  metaphysical  parts  of  the  Treatise ’, 
which  he  had  almost  ﬁnished  writing  at  that  point,  Ramsay  should  read 
Malebranche’s  Search  a er  Truth ,  Berkeley’s  Principles ,  Descartes’  Meditations ,  and 
‘some  of  the  more  metaphysical  articles  of  Bailes  [Bayle’s]  Dictionary;  such  as 
those  [of]  Zeno  and  Spinoza’.   Since  Hume  speciﬁcally  mentions  Malebranche, 64
Berkeley,  Descartes,  and  Spinoza,  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  these  were  all 
important  inﬂuences  on  Hume’s  Treatise .  However,  in  relation  to  his  potential 
borrowing  of  Buddhist  ideas,  the  fact  that  Hume  speciﬁcally  mentions  Bayle  is 
particularly  interesting:  Bayle  wrote  extensively  on  Buddhism. 
  Pierre  Bayle  (1647–1706)  was  one  of  the  major  ﬁgures  of  the  European 
Enlightenment,  whose  enormous  Dictionnaire  historique  et  critique  (Historical  and 
Critical  Dictionary)  was  one  of  the  most  popular  and  widely  read  works  of  the 
eighteenth  century.   A  Huguenot  who  spent  most  of  his  life  as  a  French  refugee 65
in  the  Dutch  Republic,  Bayle  was  a  notorious  skeptic  who  was  willing  to  openly 
question  philosophical  and  theological  dogma.  Voltaire  once  quipped:  ‘the 
greatest  master  of  the  art  of  reasoning  that  ever  wrote,  Bayle,  great  and  wise,  all 
systems  overthrows’.   And  Jonathan  Israel  writes  that  ‘No  one  else,  not  even 66
Locke,  was  a  staple  of  so  many  libraries  or  had  so  wide  a  general  inﬂuence,  his 
writings  being  everywhere  acknowledged  to  be  a  prime  cause  of  the  time  of 
skepticism,  atheism  and  materialism  sweeping  the  west  of  the  continent.’  67
  Like  many  other  European  intellectuals  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Hume 
was  a  keen  reader  of  Bayle’s  Dictionary ,  and  although  the  degree  of  Bayle’s 
inﬂuence  is  a  matter  of  debate,  it  is  obvious  that  he  was  a  major  inﬂuence  on 
Hume.  Of  course,  one  could  argue  that  since  Hume’s  letter  to  his  friend  Michael 
Ramsay  was  written  in  1737,  when  the  Treatise  was  nearly  complete,  Hume  may 
only  have  begun  to  read  Bayle  when  the  he  had  already  written  down  the 
64  Paul  Russell,  The  Riddle  of  Hume's  Treatise ,  p.  357;  Mossner,  The  Life  of  David  Hume ,  pp.  104;  626-7. 
65  The  ﬁrst  edition  appeared  in  1697.  A  second,  enlarged  edition  was  published  ﬁve  years  later  in 
1702. 
66  Cited  from  Richard  Popkin,  The  High  Road  to  Pyrrhonism  (Indianapolis  1993),  p.  158. 
67  Jonathan  Israel,  Enlightenment  Contested.  Philosophy,  Modernity,  and  the  Emancipation  of  Man 
1670-1752  (New  York  2006),  p.  87. 
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majority  of  his  ideas.  However,  in  Hume’s  so-called  Early  Memoranda ,  about  half 
of  the  entries —sixteen  in  total— directly  deal  with  Bayle.   From  these 68
memoranda  we  know  that  Hume  started  reading  him  as  early  as  1732,  years 
before  he  began  his  studies  in  France. 
  Moreover,  there  are  signiﬁcant  textual  similarities  with  Bayle  in  the 
Treatise .  In  his  discussion  of  space  and  vacuum,  for  example,  Hume  closely 
follows  Bayle’s  argument  from  the  latter’s  entry  on  Zenon  of  Elea,  and  he 
accepts  Bayle’s  three  possible  theories  regarding  the  way  that  time  and  space 
might  be  constituted.   However,  while  Bayle  points  to  contradictions  in  all  of 69
these  three  theories,  Hume  rejects  two  and  argues  that  one  may  in  fact  be 
possible.  In  his  discussion  of  vacuum  he  even  uses  the  same  metaphor:  that  of  a 
chamber  ﬁlled  with  air  from  which  all  the  air  is  released.  70
  Hume  also  clearly  took  ideas  from  Bayle’s  Spinoza  article  on  the 
metaphysics  of  substance  and  personal  identity.  Like  other  authors  of  his  day, 
Hume  begins  by  insulting  Spinozism  before  discussing  Spinoza’s  ideas.   He 71
then  describes  the  ‘fundamental  atheism  of  the  doctrine  of  Spinoza’,  that  is,  the 
doctrine  of  the  simplicity  of  the  universe,  before  reaching  his  most  famous 
statement:  
I  believe  this  brief  exposition  of  the  principles  of  that  famous  atheist 
[Spinoza]  will  be  suﬃcient  for  the  present  purpose,  and  that  without 
entering  farther  into  these  gloomy  and  obscure  regions,  I  shall  be  able 
to  shew,  that  this  hideous  hypothesis  is  almost  the  same  with  that  of 
the  immateriality  of  the  soul,  which  has  become  so  popular.   72
The  argument  that  follows  is  then  once  again  directly  li ed  from  Bayle’s 
Dictionary .  A  reference  to  Bayle’s  Spinoza  entry  on  page  243  of  the  Treatise  seems 
to  conﬁrm  this.   While  Hume  may  seem  hostile  towards  Spinoza’s  views, 73
Richard  Popkin  points  out  that  Hume  is  in  fact  not  attacking  Spinoza  here,  but 
the  theologians  who —ironically,  in  light  of  Spinoza’s  supposed  atheism— share 
virtually  the  same  ideas  on  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  as  Spinoza.  ‘If  his  view 
68  See:  Mossner,  ‘Hume's  Early  Memoranda,  1729-1740:  The  Complete  Text’,  Journal  of  the  History  of 
Ideas  9  (4)  (1948),  pp.  492-518. 
69  See:  Hume:  Treatise ,  pp.  26-27,  39-40;  Pierre  Bayle,  Historical  and  Critical  Dictionary:  Selections , 
transl.  Richard  Popkin  (Indianapolis/Cambridge  1991),  pp.  350-388. 
70  Hume,  Treatise ,  p.  54. 
71  Ibid.,  p.  240. 
72  Ibid.,  p.  241. 
73  See  Hume,  Treatise ,  note  47,  p.  243. 
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[Spinoza's]  was  the  hideous  hypothesis,  what  was  theirs  supposed  to  be?’  74
  Bayle’s  Spinoza  entry  also  happens  to  be  the  longest  entry  in  his  entire 
Dictionary .  Bayle  opens  the  article  by  stating  that  Spinoza  ‘was  a  systematic 
atheist  who  employed  a  totally  new  method,  though  the  basis  of  his  theory  was 
the  same  as  that  of  several  other  ancient  and  modern  philosophers,  both 
European  and  Oriental’,  and  writes  that  Spinoza  is  the  ﬁrst  who  boiled  down 
atheism  to  a  system.   Crucially,  Bayle  explicitly  connects  Spinozism  to  both 75
ancient  European  and  Oriental  philosophy.  Regarding  the  latter,  it  is  noteworthy 
that  he  almost  immediately  refers  to  remark  D  of  the  article  ‘Japan’  and  to 
remark  B  of  his  Spinoza  entry  titled  ‘What  I  shall  say  .  .  .  about  the  theology  of  a 
Chinese  sect’.  Both  remarks  are  in  fact  enormous  footnotes  describing  Chinese 
and  Japanese  Buddhism  respectively.  Starting  with  remark  B  on  Chinese 
Buddhism,  he  begins  by  describing  the  founder  of  the  religion: 
The  name  of  that  sect  is  Foe  Kiao  [Chinese:  fojiao ,  Buddhism].  It  was 
established  by  royal  authority  among  the  Chinese  in  the  year  65  of  the 
Christian  era.  Its  ﬁrst  founder  was  the  son  of  the  king  In  Fan  Vam ,  and 
was  at  ﬁrst  called  Xe  or  Xe  Kia  [Chinese:  Shejia ,  Shakyamuni  Buddha], 
and  then,  when  he  was  thirty  years  old,  Foe ,  that  is  to  say,  ‘not  man.’   76
Bayle  is,  of  course,  wrong  here.  Buddhism  was  far  older  than  he  believed  it  to  be, 
and  it  was  founded  not  in  China,  but  in  India.  At  the  time,  even  the  most  learned 
Europeans   were  unaware  of  Buddhism’s  true  origin.  Bayle  was  no  exception. 
Two  decades  a er  the  publication  of  Bayle’s  Dictionary ,  Ippolito  Desideri  was  in 
fact  one  of  the  ﬁrst  Europeans  to  realise  that  the  roots  of  (Tibetan)  Buddhism  lay 
in  India.   Inaccuracies  aside,  Bayle  then  goes  on  to  describe  the  story  of 77
Shakyamuni  Buddha’s  enlightenment  and  the  story  of  his  deathbed  confession: 
He,  having  retired  into  the  desert  when  he  reached  his  nineteenth 
year  and  having  put  himself  under  the  discipline  of  four 
Gymnosophists  in  order  to  learn  philosophy  from  them,  remained 
under  their  instruction  until  he  was  thirty  years  old,  when,  rising  one 
morning  before  daybreak  and  contemplating  the  planet  Venus,  the 
mere  sight  of  it  gave  him  at  once  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  ﬁrst 
74  Richard  Henry  Popkin,  ‘Hume  and  Spinoza’,  Hume  Studies  5  (2)  (1979),  p.  65-93. 
75  Bayle,  Dictionary ,  p.  288. 
76  Ibid,  p.  288. 
77  Pomplun,  Desideri’s  Mission ,  p  78. 
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principle,  so  that  being  full  of  divine  inspiration,  or  rather  of  pride 
and  madness,  he  undertook  to  instruct  men,  represented  himself  as  a 
god,  and  attracted  eighty  thousand  disciples.  .  .  .  At  the  age  of 
seventy-nine,  ﬁnding  himself  near  death,  he  told  his  disciples  that,  for 
the  forty  years  he  had  preached  to  the  world,  he  had  not  told  the  truth 
to  them;  that  he  had  concealed  it  under  a  veil  of  metaphors  and 
ﬁgures  of  speech;  but  that  it  was  time  to  tell  it  to  them.  ‘It  is,’  he  said, 
‘that  there  is  nothing  to  seek,  nor  anything  to  put  one’s  hopes  on, 
except  the  nothingness  and  the  vacuum  that  is  the  principle  of  all 
things.   78
He  states  how  Buddha  Shakyamuni  ‘divided  his  doctrine  into  two  parts,   one 
exterior,  which  is  the  one  that  is  publicly  preached  and  taught  to  the  people,  the 
other  interior,  which  is  carefully  hidden  from  the  common  people  and  made 
known  only  to  initiates. ’   This  true  doctrine  is  emptiness,  nothingness,  a 79
vacuum  ( Śūnyatā)  and  the  most  diﬃcult  to  understand.  He  explains: 
They  say  that  our  parents  came  forth  from  this  vacuum  and  that  they 
returned  there  a er  death;  that  it  is  the  same  with  all  men,  who  are 
changed  back  into  this  principle  by  death;  that  we,  all  the  elements, 
and  all  the  creatures  make  up  part  of  that  vacuum  that  thus  there  is 
but  one  and  the  same  substance,  which  is  diﬀerent  in  particular  beings 
only  by  the  shapes  and  qualities  or  interior  conﬁguration,  somewhat 
like  water,  which  is  always  essentially  water,  though  it  takes  the  form 
of  snow,  hail  rain  or  ice.  80
Bayle  is  struck  by  the  similarities  between  the  unity  of  substance  taught  by  this 
‘Chinese  sect’,  and  Spinoza’s  monist  philosophy  on  substance.  ‘.  .  .Spinoza  has 
not  been  so  absurd’,  he  concludes.   It  is  a  striking  comment,  and  reveals  that 81
Bayle  describes  the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’  for  two  speciﬁc  purposes.  First  and  most 
obviously,  his  lengthy  description  serves  to  show  that  Spinoza’s  monism  was  at 
least  in  part  shaped  by  doctrines  from  ancient  China:  the  fact  that  the  footnote 
on  the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’  is  right  at  the  start  of  the  Spinoza  entry  is  no  coincidence. 
Secondly  and  most  importantly,  Bayle  subjects  Spinoza  to  a  kind  of  relativism. 
78  Bayle,  Dictionary ,  pp.  288-289. 
79  Ibid.,  p.  290. 
80  Ibid.,  p.  290-291. 
81  Ibid.,  p.  291. 
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Bayle  uses  his  remarks  on  China  to  show  the  reader  that  Spinoza’s  ‘hideous 
hypothesis’  has  some  validity  a er  all.  Since  Spinozism  was  widely  considered 
to  be  atheistic  at  the  time,  one  could  even  argue  that  Bayle  is  implicitly 
promoting  atheism.  82
  Bayle’s  interest  in  China  was  no  coincidence  either.  It  followed  in  the 
wake  of  the  rise  of  Quietism  in  France  in  the  1670s  and  1680s,  a  religious  revival 
movement  associated  with  Miguel  de  Molinos  that  was  condemned  as  heretical 
by  Pope  Innocent  XI  in  1687  because  it  was  accused  of  elevating  withdrawal 
from  worldly  interests  and  passive  meditation  over  pious  action  and  unity  with 
God.  When  European  intellectuals  became  aware  that  similar  societies  in  China 
appeared  to  ‘empty  the  mind  of  thoughts’   a  wave  of  writings  on  China  and 83
‘Chinese  quietism’  followed.  Bayle  happily  joined  the  fray.  In  the  Spinoza  entry 
he  writes: 
Note  in  passing  that  the  followers  of  Foe  taught  quietism;  for  they  say 
that  all  those  who  seek  true  happiness  ought  to  allow  themselves  to  be 
so  absorbed  in  profound  meditations  that  they  make  no  use  of  their 
intellect,  but,  by  a  complete  insensibility,  sink  into  the  rest  and 
inaction  of  the  ﬁrst  principle,  which  is  the  true  means  of  perfectly 
resembling  it  and  partaking  of  happiness.  They  assert  also  that  a er 
one  has  reached  this  state  of  quietude,  he  should  follow  the  ordinary 
course  of  his  life  outwardly  and  teach  others  the  commonly  received 
doctrine.  84
Around  the  same  time,  Catholic  religious  orders  quarrelled  over  the 
compatibility  of  Christianity  with  Chinese  religious  rites.   The  battle  was 85
ultimately  decided  at  Paris’  prestigious  Sorbonne  in  1700,  where,  like  in  the 
other  controversies  over  native  rites,  the  conservative  camp  prevailed:  Chinese 
82  This  is  the  position  Jonathan  Israel  maintains.  Israel  argues  that  Bayle  was  one  of  several  radical 
Enlightenment  thinkers  who  used  the  comparison  between  Spinozist  and  Chinese  ‘atheism’  to 
implicitly  promote  Enlightenment  atheism,  see:  Israel,  Enlightenment  Contested ,  pp.  645-46; 
However,  Israel’s  view  of  Bayle  as  a  covert  atheist  has  been  contested,  and  others  see  him  as  a 
skeptical  ﬁdeist  instead,  see:  Simon  Kow,  ‘Enlightenment  Universalism:  Bayle  and  Montesqieu 
on  China’,  The  European  Legacy  15  (3)  (2014),  pp.  347-358  and  Jeﬀrey  Burson,  ‘Unlikely  Tales  of 
Fo  and  Ignatius:  Rethinking  the  Radical  Enlightenment  through  French  Appropriation  of 
Chinese  Buddhism’,  French  Historical  Studies  38  (3),  2015,  pp.  391-420. 
83  Most  Buddhist  schools  teach  that  ‘emptying  the  mind  of  thoughts’  is  a  pitfall  that  should  be 
avoided  during  meditation. 
84  Bayle,  Dictionary,  p.  291. 
85  Burson,  ‘Unlikely  Tales  of  Fo’,  p.  392. 
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religion  was  judged  to  be  incompatible  with  the  Christian  faith.    The 86
implications  of  this  decision  were  enormous.  It  meant  that  China,  the  most 
populous  state  in  the  world,  had  been  ‘atheist’  for  thousands  of  years. 
Unintendedly,  China,  where  seemingly  virtuous  ‘atheist’  societies  had  existed 
for  millennia,  became  an  object  of  interest  for  the  scholarly  journals  of  radical 
editors  such  Pierre  Bayle  and  the  Swiss  theologian  Jean  Le  Clerc.  87
Probably  because  the  Spinoza  entry  was  already  the  longest  article  in  the 
entire  Dictionary ,  Bayle  decided  to  add  a  separate  entry  on  Japan,  which  he 
immediately  refers  to  in  the  ﬁrst  paragraph  of  the  Spinoza  entry.  Even  more  so 
than  his  section  on  Chinese  Buddhism,  the  section  on  Japanese  Buddhism 
stresses  the  contrast  between  ‘inner’  and  ‘outer’  doctrine.  He  notes  that  those 
who  rely  on  appearances  acknowledge  a  herea er,  whereas  those  who  look 
inwards  do  not  accept  any  heaven  or  hell  ‘and  teach  notions  which  are  very 
similar  to  the  ideas  of  Spinoza’,  going  even  further  than  the  Epicureans.  88
Regarding  the  practice  of  Japanese  monks,  he  writes: 
They  neglect  what  is  exterior  and  apply  themselves  exclusively  to 
meditation.  They  thoroughly  reject  all  discipline  consisting  of  words 
and  are  only  attached  to  the  exercise  they  call  Soquxin  Qoqubut ,   that 89
is,  the  heart.  They  conﬁrm  that  there  is  only  a  single  principle  of  all 
things  and  that  this  principle  is  found  everywhere;  that  the  heart  of 
man  and  the  inner  nature  of  other  beings  does  not  diﬀer  at  all  from 
this  principle;  and  that  all  beings  return  to  this  common  principle 
when  they  are  destroyed.  They  add  that  it  exists  from  eternity  and  is 
unique,  limpid  and  luminous.  It  can  neither  grow  nor  diminish,  has 
no  form,  does  not  reason,  and  lives  in  idleness  and  perfect  rest.  90
Bayle  then  explains  the  ‘inner’  doctrine  in  greater  detail: 
1. There  is  only  one  single  principle  of  all  things;  and  this  principle  is 
sovereignly  perfect  and  wise  yet  does  not  understand  anything  and  is  not 
86  Urs  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness :  The  Western  Discovery  of  Buddhist  Thought  and  the  Invention  of 
Oriental  Philosophy  (Rorschach/Kyoto  2012).  225-227. 
87  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  225;  Thijs  Weststeijn,  ‘Spinoza  Sinicus,  An  Asian  Paragraph  in  the 
History  of  the  Radical  Enlightenment’,  Journal  of  the  History  of  Ideas  68  (4)  (2007),  pp.  537-561. 
88  Bayle,  Political  Writings ,  transl.  ed.  Sally  L.  Jenkinson  (Los  Angeles  2000),  p.  129. 
89  This  almost  certainly  refers  to  the  Japanese  soku-shin-ze-butsu  (the  heart  itself  is  the  Buddha  or 
more  literally:  this  very  mind  is  Buddha  mind).  The  Japanese  phrase  is  in  turn  a  translation 
from  a  Chinese  phrase  attributed  to  the  Zen  Master  Mazu  Daoyi  (709-788). 
90  Bayle,  Dictionary  (Rotterdam  1702),  p.  1628,  cited  in  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  232. 
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at  all  concerned  about  the  aﬀairs  of  this  world  since  it  remains  fully  at  rest 
and,  like  a  person  strongly  focused  on  something,  leaves  all  others  alone. 
2. This  principle  is  in  all  particular  things  and  communicates  its  essence  to 
them,  so  that  they  form  the  same  thing  as  it  and  return  to  it  when  they 
end.  
3. The  heart  of  man  is  not  at  all  diﬀerent  from  this  common  principle  of  all 
beings.  When  men  die,  their  hearts  perish  and  are  consumed;  but  the  ﬁrst 
principle  that  in  the  ﬁrst  gave  them  life  still  remains  in  them.  As  a  result 
there  are  neither  paradise  nor  hell,  and  neither  recompense  nor 
punishment  a er  this  life. 
4. Man  can  in  this  world  elevate  himself  to  the  condition  and  the  supreme 
majesty  of  the  ﬁrst  principle,  given  that  through  meditation  he  can  know 
it  perfectly  and  thus  attain  the  sovereign  tranquility  that  this  principle 
enjoys.  Herin  lies  all  the  good  man  can  acquire  and  until  he  has  reached  it 
through  meditation  and  through  perfect  knowledge,  he  is  agitated  in 
perpetual  unease,  passing  from  one  hell  into  another,  unable  to  ﬁnd 
quietude  anywhere.  91
 
For  his  texts  on  Asian  religion  Bayle  relied  on  a  variety  sources  from 
seventeenth-century  China  as  well  as  sources  from  Vietnam,  Siam,  Tibet,  and 
India.   The  oldest  and  arguably  most  important  sources,  however,  originated 92
from  Japan,  where  sixteenth-century  Jesuits  like  Francisco  Xavier  and  his 
successors  ﬁrst  discovered  Buddhist  ideas.  The  decades-long  presence  in  Japan 
provided  Europeans  with  the  ﬁrst  translations  and  interpretations  of  Buddhist 
(Zen)  doctrine.  Flawed  as  these  interpretations  were,  Jesuit  knowledge  of 
Japanese  Buddhism  slowly  but  gradually  increased  over  time.  For  example,  by 
1558,  the  Jesuit  superior  of  Asian  missions  Belchior  Nunes  Barreto  appears  to 
have  been  the  ﬁrst  European  to  realise  that  the  religion  of  Japan  is  also  present 
in  China  and  Pegu  (Burma).  In  a  letter  to  Diego  Laynez,  the  Superior  General  of 
his  order,  he  writes: 
91  Bayle,  Dictionary ,  p.  1629,  cited  in  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  pp.  232-233. 
92  App,  The  Birth  of  Orientalism  (Philadelphia  2010),  p.  11. 
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This  is  the  pseudo-theology  of  Xaqua   and  Amida   which  also  reigns 93 94
all  over  China  and  Pegu   where  this  pest,  to  the  best  of  my 95
knowledge,  came  from.  These  are  the  devil’s  tricks  [doli  diaboli],  this 
is  the  science  that  the  bonzes  and  the  nobles  discuss  in  their  schools 
[in  suis  gynnasiis],  and  this  is  the  kind  of  demonic  deception  of  the 
prevalent  sect  that  they  call  ‘sect  of  meditators.  96
 
The  letter  also  reveals  the  general  attitude  towards  other  religions  that  was 
almost  universally  shared  among  Jesuit  missionaries  for  centuries.  On  the  one 
hand,  Jesuits  were  learned,  highly  educated  men,  willing  to  learn  as  much  as 
they  could  about  foreign  religions,  but  on  the  other  hand  non-Christian 
doctrines  were  usually  condemned  in  the  strongest  terms.  Even  the  most 
accurate  Jesuit  accounts  ultimately  served  to  show  the  theological  superiority  of 
the  Catholic  faith  over  the  fundamental  errors  of  the  pagan  religions.  
  The  most  inﬂuential  of  these  early  Jesuit  reports  was  a  catechism  based 
on  a  series  of  lecture  manuscripts  by  the  Italian  Jesuit  Alessandro  Valignano 
(1539  –  1606),  who  intended  to  use  them  for  the  education  of  both  Japanese  and 
European  students  in  the  newly  opened  seminaries  and  Jesuit  colleges  in  Kyoto. 
Like  the  Jesuits  that  preceded  him,  Valignano  relied  heavily  on  Japanese 
converts  who  were  able  to  provide  him  with  translations  of  Zen  doctrine  that 
Europeans  could  understand.   While  Valignano’s  lectures  were  clearly  not 97
intended  for  a  European  audience,  the  catechism  was  nevertheless  published 
without  his  knowledge  in  Lisbon  in  1586  under  the  title  Catechismus  christianae 
 dei .   Its  importance  to  Oriental  studies  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  provides  one  of 98
the  ﬁrst  comprehensive  critiques  of  Buddhism.  The  Swiss  historian  Urs  App 
(2012),  who  has  reconstructed  much  of  the  Jesuits’  early  contact  with  Buddhism, 
regards  Valignano’s  cathechism  as  ‘the  record  of  the  West’s  earliest  encounter 
with  Buddhist  philosophy.’   It  formed  the  basis  for  successive  missionary  eﬀorts 99
93  From  the  Japanese  Shaka ,  derived  from  the  Sanskrit  Śākya ,  the  ancient  tribe  of  the  historical 
Gautama  Buddha.  
94  The  Japanese  term  for  Amitābha  Buddha,  the  principal  Buddha  of  Pure  Land  Buddhism,  one  of 
the  largest  branches  of  Mahāyāna  Buddhism. 
95  Southern  Burma 
96  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  42. 
97  J.  F.  Moran,  The  Japanese  and  the  Jesuits:  Alessandro  Valignano  in  Sixteenth-Century  Japan  (London 
1993),  pp.  179-186. 
98  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  pp.  51-60;  Mia  M.  Mochizuki,  ‘The  Diaspora  of  a  Jesuit  Press:  Mimetic 
Imitation  on  the  World  Stage,  in  Dietz,  Morton,  Roggen,  Stronks  &  van  Vaeck  (eds.),  Illustrated 
Religious  Texts  in  the  North  of  Europe,  1500-1800  (Farnham  2014),  p.  117. 
99  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  60. 
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in  Asia.  For  example,  Matteo  Ricci's  catechism  Tiānzhŭ  Shíyì  ( The  True  Meaning  of 
the  Lord  of  Heaven) ,  which  argues  that  Christianity  and  Confucianism  are  not 
opposed  to  each  other,  was  heavily  indebted  to  the  earlier  work  of  Valignano 
and  his  Japanese  collaborators.   Moreover,  because  the  Catechismus  christianae 100
 dei  was  inadvertently  published  in  Lisbon  for  a  European  audience,  its 
inﬂuence  extended  beyond  just  the  Jesuit  colleges  around  Asia.  Indeed,  App  sees 
the  accidental  publication  of  Valignano’s  catechism  as  one  of  the  turning  points 
in  the  history  of  European  intellectual  interest  in  Asia:   ‘Republished  as  part  of 
Possevino’s  Bibliotheca  selecta  (1603),  Valignano’s  Catechismus  became  a  textbook 
for  generations  of  missionaries  as  well  as  young  Europeans  studying  at  Jesuit 
colleges.  [.  .  .]  Thus,  relatively  obscure  mission  materials  from  faraway  Japan 
burrowed  their  way  into  European  public  consciousness  and  ended  up 
furnishing  major  building  blocks  for  the  invention  of  ‘Oriental  philosophy.’’   101
  According  to  App,  Bayle,  who  had  studied  at  a  Jesuit  college  in  Toulouse 
in  his  youth,  based  his  description  of  ‘inner’  and  ‘outer’  doctrine  in  the  ‘Japan’ 
entry  largely  on  Valignano’s  much  older  catechism,  whereas  the  information  in 
the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’  footnote  from  the  Spinoza  entry  is  largely  borrowed  from 
Philippe  Couplet’s  ( 1623  –  1693)  Confucius  sinarum  philosophus  (1687).   The 102
Confucius  sinarum  philosophus  primarily  deals  with  Chinese  Confucianism,  but  its 
introduction  contains  a  section  on  Buddhism  that  was  long  thought  to  be 
written  by  the  Sicilian  Jesuit  Prospero  Intorcetta  (1626  –  1696).  However,  on  the 
basis  of  a  previously  overlooked  handwritten  remark  in  the  manuscript  that 
Couplet  omitted  from  the  printed  version  of  the  Confucius  sinarum  philosophus , 
App  argues  that  Intorcetta  relied  on  yet  another  source:  the  Portuguese  João 
Rodrigues  (1561  or  1562  –  1633  or  1634),  who  was  one  of  the  leading  European 
experts  on  Japan  and  China,  and,  having  lived  in  Japan  for  thirty  years,  one  of 
the  few  Jesuits  who  was  knowledgeable  on  Buddhism  at  all.   Unbeknownst  to 103
himself,  or  anyone  else  for  that  matter,  it  appears  that  Bayle’s  section  on  the 
‘Sect  of  Foe’  was  largely  based  on  Rodrigues’  writings  from  the  1620s  rather  than 
those  of  Intorcetta  from  the  1660s.  Thus,  the  popular  Confucius  sinarum 
philosophus  provided  European  intellectuals  like  Bayle  with  a  biased,  simpliﬁed, 
and  considerably  ﬂawed  European  interpretation  of  the  Buddha’s  deathbed 
100  Thierry  Meynard,  ‘The  Overlooked  Connection  between  Ricci’s  Tianzhu  shiyi  and  Valignano’s 
Catechismus  Japonensis,’  Japanese  Journal  of  Religious  Studies  40  (2)  (2013),  pp.  303-322. 
101  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  57. 
102  Ibid.,  p.  231. 
103  Ibid.,  138-144. 
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confession  of  ‘inner’  and  ‘outer’  doctrines  that  had  its  roots  in  Sino-Japanese  Zen 
Buddhism.  
  Since  Hume  had  almost  certainly  read  Bayle’s  article  on  Spinoza  by  1732, 
it  seems  only  natural  to  assume  that  Hume  must  also  have  been  familiar  with 
the  article’s  description  of  the  Buddha’s  life,  the  contrast  between  ‘inner’  and 
‘outer’  doctrine,  and  the  supposed  shared  monism  between  Buddhism  and 
Spinozism.   Yet  closer  scrutiny  of  Hume’s  letters  and  early  memoranda  reveals 104
that  this  is  far  from  certain.  Bayle  only  added  his  remarks  on  China  in  the 
Spinoza  entry  as  well  as  the  entire  ‘Japan’  article  in  the  second  edition  of  the 
Dictionary  (1702),  whereas  the  initial  ﬁrst  edition  (1697)  makes  no  mention  of 
either  the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’  of  the  ‘inner’  doctrine  of  the  Japanese  monks.   Rather, 105
using  François  Bernier’s  (1620-1688)  earlier  writings  on  the  existence  of  a 
pan-Asian  philosophy,  Bayle  compares  Spinoza  to  philosophical  ideas  from 
India  and  Persia.  In  other  words,  the  second  edition  of  the  Dictionary  expands 
the  notion  that  Asian  religion  was  rife  with  Spinozism  and  quietism  to  the 
entirety  of  the  continent. 
  Most  scholars  seem  to  overlook  this  crucial  diﬀerence  between  the  two 
editions  of  the  Dictionary .  When  Bayle’s  Spinoza  article  is  mentioned  in  relation 
to  Hume,  they  refer  to  either  the  1697  or  the  1702  edition,  as  if  the  two  versions 
are  interchangeable.   The  distinction  is  important  because  Hume  never 106
explicitly  mentions  which  edition  of  Bayle’s  Dictionary  he  used  in  either  his 
letters  or  his  memoranda.   For  example,  in  his  1737  letter  to  Michael  Ramsay 107
he  writes  that  in  order  to  understand  the  Treatise ,  Ramsay  should  read  ‘some  of 
the  more  metaphysical  articles  of  Bailes  [Bayle’s]  Dictionary;  such  as  those  [of] 
Zeno  and  Spinoza’,   but  he  never  speciﬁes  which  edition  his  friend  Ramsay 108
should  read.  At  least  Hume  is  consistent  in  his  bibliographical  sloppiness.  When 
Hume  in  his  Treatise  refers  to  Bayle’s  Spinoza  entry  the  footnote  only  states:  ‘See 
104  See:  Mossner,  ‘Hume's  Early  Memoranda’,  p.  494. 
105  For  a  more  speciﬁc  comparison  of  the  two  editions,  see:  App,  The  Cult  of  Emptiness ,  p.  228-229. 
106   For  example,  Mossner  cites  the  1697  edition,  see:  Mossner,  ‘Hume's  Early  Memoranda’,  p.  498; 
Jeﬀrey  Burson  likewise  refers  to  the  1697  edition,  see:  Burson,  ‘Unlikely  Tales  of  Fo’,  p.  417; 
Zuzana  Parusnikvá  refers  to  the  1702  edition  instead,  see:  Zuzana  Parusniková  uses  the  1702 
edition,  see:  Zuzana  Parusniková,  David  Hume ,  Sceptic  (Prague  2016),  p.  72;  Jonardon  Ganieri 
even  makes  the  controversial  claim  that  Hume’s  Treatise  was  directly  inspired  by  Bayle’s 
sections  on  Buddhism  in  the  1702  edition  of  the  Dictionary ,  see:  Jonardon  Ganieri,  The  Concealed 
Art  of  the  Soul :  Theories  of  Self  and  Practices  of  Truth  in  Indian  Ethics  and  Epistemology  (New  York 
2007)  pp.  228-31. 
107
  See:  Mossner,  ‘Hume's  Early  Memoranda’,  pp.  492-518;  Mossner,  The  Life  of  David  Hume ,  pp.  104; 
626-7. 
108  Mossner,  The  Life  of  David  Hume ,  pp.  104;  626-7. 
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Bayle ’s  dictionary,  article  of  Spinoza .’   109
  There  are  therefore  three  distinct  possibilities:  The  ﬁrst  is  that  when 
Hume  was  composing  the  Treatise  he  was  only  familiar  with  the  initial  1697 
edition  of  Bayle’s  Dictionary ;  the  second  possibility  is  that  he  had  read  the  1702 
edition  instead;  the  third  and  ﬁnal  possibility  is  that  Hume  was  familiar  with 
both  the  ﬁrst  and  second  editions.  Until  someone  discovers  which  edition(s) 
Hume  was  using  in  the  early  1730s  it  could  be  any  of  these  three  possibilities 
whereas  only  the  last  two  suggest  that  Hume  was  almost  certainly  familiar  with 
Bayle’s  section  on  the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’,  and  possibly  the  ‘Japan’  article.  In  short,  it  is 
impossible  to  conclude  for  certain  whether  Hume  had  read  Bayle’s  descriptions 
of  Buddhism  when  he  published  the  Treatise  in  1738. 
  Finally,  while  Hume  may  well  have  read  Bayle’s  descriptions  of 
Buddhism,  they  are  so  far  removed  from  both  the  philosophy  of  Nāgārjuna  and 
Hume’s  own  ideas  that  we  must  ask  ourselves:  is  the  Buddhism  as  described  in 
Bayle  still  Buddhism?  Rather  than  being  an  accurate  depiction  of  Buddhist 
philosophy,  the  Buddhism  in  Bayle’s  Dictionary  reﬂects  the  Jesuits’  initial  biased 
accounts  of  Buddhism  as  an  atheist  sect,  and,  based  on  these  accounts,  Bayle’s 
own  interpretation  of  Buddhism  as  a  kind  of  ancient  proto-Spinozist  sect 
covering  nearly  all  of  the  Asian  continent.  The  Spinoza  and  Japan  entries  alone 
do  certainly  not  explain  Hume’s  views  on  substance  and  the  self.  Still,  there  is 
yet  another  way  in  which  Hume  may  have  been  inﬂuenced  by  Buddhism,  albeit 
indirectly  and  without  his  knowledge:  through  the  writings  of  Sextus  Empiricus. 
 
   
109  See:  Hume,  Treatise ,  Book  1,  note  47. 
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Pyrrhonian  Appearances 
While  Hume’s  views  on  personal  identity  and  substance  have  o en  been 
compared  to  similar  ideas  in  Buddhism,  both  Hume  and  Buddhism  respectively 
have  also  been  linked  to  Pyrrhonism,  an  ancient  school  Greek  philosophy 
believed  to  have  been  founded  by  the  enigmatic  Pyrrho  of  Elis  (c.  360  BC  –  c. 
270  BC).  Although  no  writings  of  Pyrrho  of  Elis  survived  antiquity—he 
reportedly  wrote  poetry  while  on  expedition  with  Alexander  the 
Great—Pyrrhonian  skepticism  was  kept  alive  through  the  works  of  Sextus 
Empiricus  (c.  160  –  c.  210  CE),  who  attributed  the  founding  of  the  school  to 
Pyrrho.  Sextus,  in  turn,  was  rediscovered  during  the  early  modern  period  and 
widely  read  during  Hume’s  youth. 
  Several  authors  have  also  pointed  out  the  striking  similarities  between 
Madhyamaka  and  ancient  Pyrrhonian  ideas,  and  some  even  claim  that 
Pyrrhonism  is  in  fact  an  ancient  ‘import’  of  Buddhism  from  Asia  to  Greece.  110
These  claims  are  particularly  interesting  in  the  light  of  Hume’s  presumed 
borrowing  of  Buddhist  ideas,  since  Hume  established  himself  as  one  of  the 
foremost  critics  of  Pyrrhonism  during  his  lifetime.  If  Pyrrhonism  was  indeed 
imported  from  India  in  the  wake  of  Alexander  the  Great’s  conquests,  long 
before  the  Jesuits  ever  came  into  contact  with  Buddhist  societies,  this  suggests 
that  Hume  may  inadvertently  have  come  into  contact  with  what  had  originally 
been  Buddhist  ideas  through  Pyrrhonism.   All  of  this  will  be  discussed  below, 
but  let  us  start  with  Hume’s  connection  to  Pyrrhonism  ﬁrst. 
  Hume  critiques  Pyrrhonism  at  length  in  An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human 
Understanding  (1748),  one  of  his  other  major  works,  and  generally  considered  to 
be  a  revision  of  his  earlier  Treatise .  In  the  Enquiry  he  explicitly  warns  against 
extreme,  dogmatic  skepticism  which,  rather  than  providing  philosophical 
clarity,  merely  leads  to  a  kind  of  nihilism.  He  writes: 
 
For  here  is  the  chief  and  most  confounding  objection  to  excessive 
scepticism,  that  no  durable  good  can  ever  result  from  it;  while  it 
110  On  the  philosophical  similarities  between  Madhyamaka  Buddhism  and  Pyrrhonism,  see: 
Thomas  McEvilley,  The  Shape  of  Ancient  Thought:  Comparative  Studies  in  Greek  and  Indian 
Philosophies  (New  York  2002)  pp.  800-871;  For  authors  making  historical  claims,  see:  Adrian 
Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism:  How  the  Greeks  Reinvented  Buddhism  (Lanham  2010);  Christopher  I. 
Beckwith,  Greek  Buddha:  Pyrrho’s  Encounter  with  Buddhism  in  Central  Asia  (Princeton/Oxford 
2015).  
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remains  in  its  full  force  and  vigour.  We  need  only  ask  such  a  sceptic, 
What  his  meaning  is?  And  what  he  proposes  by  all  these  curious  researches?   111
 
This  excessive  skepticism  is,  of  course,  Pyrrhonism,  which  he  then  compares, 
unfavourably,  to  other  forms  of  skepticism: 
 
A  Copernican  or  Ptolemaic,  who  supports  each  his  diﬀerent  system  of 
astronomy,  may  hope  to  produce  a  conviction,  which  will  remain 
constant  and  durable,  with  his  audience.  A  Stoic  or  Epicurean  displays 
principles,  which  may  not  only  be  durable,  but  which  have  an  eﬀect 
on  conduct  and  behaviour.  But  a  Pyrrhonian  cannot  expect,  that  his 
philosophy  will  have  any  constant  inﬂuence  on  the  mind:  Or  if  it  had, 
that  its  inﬂuence  would  be  beneﬁcial  to  society.  On  the  contrary,  he 
must  acknowledge,  if  he  will  acknowledge  any  thing,  that  all  human 
life  must  perish,  were  his  principles  universally  and  steadily  to  prevail. 
All  discourse,  all  action  would  immediately  cease;  and  men  remain  in 
a  total  lethargy,  till  the  necessities  of  nature,  unsatisﬁed,  put  an  end  to 
their  miserable  existence.  112
 
Here,  Hume  essentially  gives  each  form  of  skepticism   a  moral  character:  A 113
Stoic  or  Epicurean  displays  principles  ‘which  have  an  eﬀect  on  conduct  and 
behaviour’;  the  philosophy  of  a  Pyrrhonian,  on  the  other  hand,  will  never  be 
beneﬁcial  to  society.  Hume’s  criticism  of  Pyrrhonism  was  so  inﬂuential  that  his 
interpretation  of  it  eﬀectively  became  the  standard  explanation  of  Pyrrhonism 
in  ‘Western  philosophy’.   Pyrrhonian  skepticism  and  philosophical  nihilism 114
became  virtually  synonymous.  Indeed,  Hume  seems  to  identify  more  with  a 
‘mitigated’  form  of  skepticism  that  once  prevailed  in  Plato’s  Academy,  o en 
referred  to  as  academic  skepticism,  than  with  the  ‘excessive’  skepticism  of 
Pyrrho.  This  distinction  between  excessive  Pyrrhonian  skepticism  and  mitigated 
academic  skepticism  appears  to  have  little  basis  in  reality,  however,  and  Hume’s 
idea  of  radical  or  extreme  skepticism  seems  to  have  more  in  common  with  the 
kind  Descartes  describes  in  his  ﬁrst  Meditation  or  the  skepticism  of  Bayle  than 
111  Hume,  An  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding  (1748)  in  Hume,  Philosophical  Essays 
Concerning  Human  Understanding  (London  1777),  pp.  159-160. 
112  Hume ,  Enquiry ,  pp.  159-160. 
113  The  Stoics  were  in  fact  the  main  opponents  of  ancient  skepticism. 
114  Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism ,  pp.  28-31. 
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with  the  kind  of  ancient  Greek  skepticism  that  is  commonly  attributed  to  Pyrrho 
of  Elis,  which  makes  one  wonder  whether  Hume  had  a  proper  understanding  of 
ancient  Greek  philosophy  at  all.   115
  While  Hume  had  almost  certainly  read  Sextus  himself  when  he  was 
writing  the  Enquiry  in  the  1740s,  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  had  done  so  when  he 
was  still  composing  the  earlier  Treatise .   At  the  same  time,  Hume  does  cite 116
Pyrrho  of  Elis  in  his  early  memoranda,  suggesting  that  he  must  at  least  have 
known  about  Pyrrho  since  1731  at  the  latest,  well  before  he  began  working  on  the 
Treatise .   He  would  also  almost  certainly  have  read  Bayle’s  lengthy  article  on 117
Pyrrho  in  the  Dictionary ,  which  states  that  ‘the  art  of  disputing  about  all  things 
and  always  suspending  one’s  judgment  is  most  commonly  called  ‘Pyrrhonism.’’  118
Exactly  how  familiar  Hume  was  with  Sextus’  original  texts  in  the  early  1730s  is 
still  something  of  a  mystery,  however.  Richard  Popkin,  who  as  a  student  in  the 
1940s  was  the  ﬁrst  to  point  out  Hume’s  debt  to  Sextus  Empiricus,  suggests 
Fabricius’  1718  Opera  Graece  et  Latine  as  the  most  likely  source  for  Hume’s  early 
familiarity  with  Sextus.   Besides  Fabricius’  text,  which  became  the  basis  for 119
nearly  every  other  subsequent  edition  of  Sextus,  Hume  also  had  access  to  other 
books  on  Pyrrhonism,  such  as  the  Swiss  mathematician  Claude  Huart’s 
translation  of  Sextus  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism ,  Thomas  Stanley’s  History  of 
Philosophy ,  which  included  both  biographies  of  the  ancient  Pyrrhonian 
philosophers  and  an  English  translation  of  Sextus’  Outlines ,  and  possibly  Hervet’s 
edition  of  Adversus  Mathematicos  (1569).   120
  Another  explanation  is  that  Hume  may  have  attempted  to  understand 
Sextus’  original  texts  before  he  published  the  Treatise ,  but  that  he  was  simply  too 
insecure  about  his  understanding  of  Greek  to  cite  Sextus.  In  his  autobiography 
he  writes: 
 
115  Peter  Loptson,  ‘Hume  and  Ancient  Philosophy’,  British  Journal  for  the  History  of  Philosophy  20  (4) 
(2012),  p.  756;  Peter  Fosl  points  out  that  in  both  the  second  Enquiry  and  the  Enquiry  Concerning 
the  Principles  of  Morals  Hume  was  citing  from  the  then-outdated  Chouet  brothers  edition  of 
Sextus  (1621),  which  suggests  that  Hume  was  not  citing  from  Sextus’  texts  themselves,  see:  Peter 
S.  Fosl  ‘Skepticism  and  the  Possibility  of  Nature’,  in  Pyrrhonism  in  Ancient,  Modern,  and 
Contemporary  Philosophy ,  ed.  Diego  E.  Machuca  (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New  York  2011). 
116  Julia  Annas  argues  that  while  Hume  did  indeed  read  Sextus  subsequently,  he  had  probably  not 
yet  done  so  when  he  published  his  Treatise ,  see:  Julia,  Annas  ‘Hume  and  Ancient  Scepticism’,  in 
Ancient  Scepticism  and  the  Sceptical  Tradition,  ed.  Juha  Sihvola  (Acta  Philosophica  Fennica,  vol.  66 
(Helsinki  2000)),  p.  271. 
117  See:  Mossner,  ‘Hume's  Early  Memoranda’,  p.  497. 
118  Bayle,  Dictionary ,  p.  194. 
119  Richard  Popkin,  The  High  Road  to  Pyrrhonism  (Indianapolis  1993),  p.  139. 
120  Fosl,  ‘Skepticism  and  the  Possibility  of  Nature’,  p.  148. 
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In  1742  ,  I  print  at  Edinburgh,  the  ﬁrst  part  of  my  Essays.  The  work  was 
favorably  received,  and  soon  made  me  entirely  forget  my  former 
disappointment.   I  continued  with  my  mother  and  brother  in  the 121
country,  and  in  that  time  recovered  the  knowledge  of  the  Greek 
language,  which  I  had  too  much  neglected  in  my  early  youth.  122
 
It  is  not  unconceivable  and  even  likely  that  Hume  used  the  time  spent  at  his 
family  estate  following  the  unfortunate  publication  of  the  Treatise  to  improve  his 
knowledge  of  the  Greek  language.  This  would  then  allow  him  to  better 
understand  Sextus’  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism .  Nevertheless,  even  then  it  is  doubtful 
whether  Hume  ever  acquired  a  proper  understanding  of  Pyrrhonism  at  all. 
Committed  modern-day  Pyrrhonists  like  Kuzminski  (2008)  do  certainly  not 
seem  to  think  he  did.  123
  Although  Hume  never  mentions  Pyrrho,  Sextus  Empiricus,  or 
Pyrrhonism  explicitly  in  the  Treatise ,  possibly  because  he  thought  his  Greek  was 
lacking,  it  is  evident  that  he  had  by  then  already  formed  the  basic  notion  of 
Pyrrhonism  that  he  put  forward  more  explicitly  in  his  Enquiry .  In  the  Treatise , 
Hume  frequently  mentions  an  ‘extravagant’  or  ‘total’  skepticism,  contrasting  it 
with  a  more  ‘moderate’  form  of  academic  skepticism.   Moreover,  in  an  abstract 124
in  which  he  reﬂects  on  the  Treatise  he  states  that  ‘Philosophy  wou'd  render  us 
entirely  Pyrrhonian,  were  not  nature  too  strong  for  it,’  conﬁrming  that  he 
explicitly  made  the  distinction  between  'excessive’  Pyrrhonian  skepticism  and 
‘mitigated’  academic  skepticism  as  early  as  1740.  125
  Lastly,  there  are  some  remarkable  philosophical  similarities  between 
Sextus’  Outlines  and  Hume’s  Treatise .   The  most  obvious  example  of  this  is  the 126
so-called  ‘problem  of  induction’,  which  Hume  considered  to  be  unsolvable.  It 
has  since  become  one  of  the  fundamental  questions  within  Western  philosophy, 
and  the  one  that  Hume  has  become  most  famous  for.  The  problem  of  induction 
concerns,  as  the  name  suggests,  the  justiﬁcation  for  using  inductive  methods, 
where,  to  use  Hume’s  own  words,  ‘instances  of  which  we  have  had  no  experience 
121  The  Treatise  ‘fell  dead-born  from  the  press’.  
122  Hume,  My  Own  Life ,  p.  2. 
123  See:  Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism ,  pp.  28-7. 
124  Hume,  Treatise ,  pp.  183-184,  214,  228,  268,  272,  
125  Hume,  An  Abstract  of  a  late  Philosophical  Performance,  entitled  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  &c. 
Wherein  the  chief  Arguraent  and  Design  of  the  Book,  which  has  met  with  such  Opposition,  and  been 
represented  in  so  terrifying  a  Light,  is  further  illustrated  and  explain'd  ( London  1740). 
126  See:  Jan  Palkoska,  ‘Are  Humean  Beliefs  Pyrrhonian  Appearances?  Hume’s  Critique  of 
Pyrrhonism  Revisited’,  The  Journal  of  Scottish  Philosophy  10  (2)  (2012),  pp.  183-98.  
39 
resemble  those  of  which  we  have  had  experience’.   It  is,  in  other  words,  a 127
problem  concerning  causality.  For  example,  we  expect  the  Sun  to  rise  tomorrow, 
but  we  cannot  really  know  that.  And  yet  we  assume  it  will  because  our  past 
experience  has  been  that  the  Sun  rises  every  day.  Hume  argues  that  this 
assumption  is  not  based  on  reason,  but  on  the  natural  human  instincts:  ‘ Nature, 
by  an  absolute  and  uncontroulable  necessity  has  determin’d  us  to  judge  as  well 
as  to  breathe  and  feel’.   The  paradox  is  that  our  causal  beliefs,  which  are  based 128
solely  on  custom  and  experience,  are  actually  the  only  beliefs  that  are  reliable. 
  And  yet,  despite  his  strong  association  with  the  problem  of  induction  in 
Western  philosophy,   it  was  not  Hume  but  Sextus  who  ﬁrst  formulated  it.  In  the 129
Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism  he  states: 
 
It  is  also  easy,  I  think,  to  dispose  of  their  [the  Dogmatist’s]  method  of 
induction.  They  claim  that  the  universal  is  established  from  the 
particulars  by  means  of  induction.  If  this  is  so,  they  will  eﬀect  it  by 
reviewing  either  all  the  particulars  or  only  some  of  them.  But  if  they 
review  only  some,  their  induction  will  be  unreliable,  since  it  is 
possible  that  some  of  the  particulars  omitted  in  the  induction  may 
contradict  the  universal.   130
 
The  diﬀerence  between  Hume’s  and  Sextus’  arguments  lies  in  the  fact  that 
Hume  comments  on  the  circular  reasoning  of  induction,  whereas  Sextus  stresses 
the  disparity  between  premises  and  conclusion  instead.  On  the  other  hand, 
Hume  may  have  li ed  his  argument  from  yet  another  argument  by  Sextus 
where  the  latter  likewise  argues  against  circular  reasoning:  131
 
Those  who  profess  to  be  able  to  judge  the  truth  are  bound  to  have  a 
criterion  of  truth.  Now,  this  criterion  is  either  untested  or  tested.  And 
if  it  is  untested,  how  can  it  be  trustworthy?  No  subject  of  dispute  is 
without  judging  trustworthy.  But  if  it  is  tested,  then  that  which 
adjudges  it  is  in  turn  either  untested  or  tested.  And  if  untested,  it  is 
127  Hume,  Treatise ,  p.  89. 
128  Ibid.,  p.  183. 
129  The  ancient  Indian  materialist  school  of  Cārvāka  posited  the  same  problem. 
130  Sextus  Empiricus,  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism ,  Book  One,  transl.  Sanford  G.  Etheridge  ed.  Phillip  P. 
Hallie,  p.  105. 
131  For  a  more  detailed  discussion,  see:  Ruth  Weintraub,  ‘What  was  Hume's  Contribution  to  the 
Problem  of  Induction?’,  The  Philosophical  Quarterly  45  (181),  pp.  460-470. 
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untrustworthy,  if  tested,  that  which  tests  it  is  again  either  tested  or  not 
tested,  and  so  on  ad  in nitum .  132
 
Indeed,  following  Popkin,  some  philosophers  argue  that  despite  his  apparent 
attack  on  Pyrrhonism  in  the  Enquiry ,  Hume’s  skeptical  arguments  in  Book  I  of 
the  Treatise  actually  come  very  close  to  the  Pyrrhonism  that  Sextus  sets  out  in 
his  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism .   Beckwith  (2015)  even  considers  Hume  to  be  the  early 133
modern  spiritual  successor  to  Sextus  Empiricus,   writing  that  ‘Hume  was 134
strongly  inﬂuenced  by  Late  Pyrrhonism,  including  the  ideas  of  Sextus 
Empiricus.’  That  seems  to  be  something  of  an  overstatement,  however.  Given 
the  current  evidence,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  answer  how  familiar  with 
Pyrrhonism  Hume  really  was.  It  appears  that  he  understood  central  ideas  from 
Sextus’  Outlines  and  incorporated  them  into  his  own  philosophy,  yet  he 
managed  to  incorrectly  interpret  Pyrrhonism  as  fundamentally  nihilistic, 
eﬀectively  tarnishing  the  reputation  of  Pyrrhonian  skepticism  for  centuries  to 
come.  Peter  Loptson  (2012)  suggests  Hume  was  a  lover  of  ancient  literature,  but 
actually  held  ancient  philosophy  in  very  low  regard.   If  correct,  it  appears  that 135
Hume  never  made  a  genuine  eﬀort  to  understand  Sextus  beyond  the  superﬁcial 
level,  yet  unwittingly  became  something  of  a  Pyrrhonian  skeptic  in  the  process. 
  This  might  also  explain  why  Hume’s  metaphysics  resemble  that  of 
Madhyamaka  Buddhism.  Pyrrhonism  and  Madhyamaka  are  o en  so  similar, 
both  in  their  ideas  and  in  their  respective  terminologies,  that  they  seem  almost 
synonymous.   The  clearest  example  of  this  is  how  Pyrrhonism  and 136
Madhymaka  share  very  similar  views  regarding  the  fundamental  nature  of 
reality.  In  the  Outlines ,  Sextus  states  time  upon  time  again  his  skeptical  position: 
‘I  assert  nothing’,  ‘I  assert  no  position’,  ‘I  suspend  judgement’.‘   Indeed,  one 137
might  say  that  this  suspension  of  judgement  is  the  central  tenet  of  Pyrrhonism.
  It  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  Nāgārjuna’s  ‘thesislessness’,  a  position  that 138
132  Sextus  Empiricus,  Against  the  Logicians ,  Book  One,  transl.  Sanford  G.  Etheridge,  ed.  Phillip  P. 
Hallie,  p.  145-146. 
133  See:  Popkin,  The  High  Road  to  Pyrrhonism ;  Palkoska,  ‘Are  Humean  Beliefs  Pyrrhonian 
Appearances?’,  pp.  183-98.  
134  Beckwith,  Greek  Buddha ,  p.  166. 
135  Loptson,  ‘Hume  and  Ancient  Philosophy’,  pp.  741-772. 
136  Garﬁeld,  ‘Epoche  and  śūnyatā:  Skepticism  East  and  West’,  Philosophy  East  and  West  40  (3)  (1990), 
pp.  285-307.;  McEvilley,  The  Shape  of  Ancient  Thought ,  pp.  800-871,  Georges  Dreyfus, 
‘Madhyamaka  and  Classical  Greek  Skepticism’,  in  The  Cowherds,  Moonshadows:  Conventional 
Truth  in  Buddhist  Philosophy  (New  York  2011),  pp.  1-21. 
137  Sextus  Empiricus,  Outlines ,  p.  33-4,  37,  41,  41-2,  54,  65,  72-3,  77,  82,  85,  89,  96,  109-10. 
138  Note:  In  Book  I  of  the  Treatise  Hume  mentions  ‘total  suspense  of  judgement’,  see:  Hume, 
Treatise ,  p.  184.  
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has  o en  been  criticised  as  contradictory  by  other  schools  of  Buddhism.  139
When  Nāgārjuna  refuted  the  idea  that  ‘things’  have  real  essences,  his  opponents 
pointed  out  that  he  could  only  make  that  argument  by  relating  it  to  some  kind 
of  independent  standard  or  reality,  which  would  in  turn  contradict  his  own 
argument.  His  opponents  said  that  if  everything  is  indeed  empty  of  essence,  as 
Nāgārjuna  claimed,  no  ‘things’  could  be  said  to  exist  at  all,  not  even  Buddhism 
itself.  Nāgārjuna’s  infamous  answer  was  that  if  he  had  a  thesis,  his  opponents 
would  be  right,  but  since  he  does  not  have  a  thesis,  he  cannot  contradict  himself.
 140
  While  this  might  seem  like  a  convenient  way  to  get  out  of  a  diﬁcult 
argument,  the  Madhyamakas  say  that  although  the  way  we  perceive  ‘things’  may 
be  deeply  incoherent,  it  makes  no  sense  to  attempt  to  think  about  how  things 
really  are,  because  we  cannot  form  an  idea  about  reality  beyond  our  own  ability 
to  perceive  it.  Rather  than  being  nihilistic,  for  the  Madhymaka  this  realisation  is 
liberating:  since  it  makes  no  sense  to  think  about  how  things  really  are,  we 
should  be  content  with  how  we  perceive  them,  use  common  sense,  and  attempt 
to  untangle  the  inconsistencies  in  our  minds.  141
  Madhyamaka  schools  disagree  on  how  Nāgārjuna’s  paradox  should  be 
interpreted,   but  the  realisation  that  we  cannot  (yet)  make  statements  about 142
how  things  really  are  is  shared  by  the  Pyrrhonian  skeptics.  When  Sextus 
explains  how  the  skeptic  should  live  his  skepticism  he  states:  143
 
.  .  .The  question  is  whether  it  is  in  reality  as  it  appears  to  be.  Now,  we 
cannot  be  entirely  inactive  when  it  comes  to  the  observances  of 
everyday  life.  Therefore,  while  living  undogmatically,  we  pay  due 
regard  to  appearances.  This  observance  of  the  requirements  of  daily 
life  seems  to  be  fourfold,  with  the  following  particular  heads:  the 
guidance  of  nature,  the  compulsion  of  the  feelings,  the  tradition  of 
139  Dreyfus,  ‘Madhyamaka  and  Classical  Greek  Skepticism’,  p.  2. 
140  Garﬁeld,  ‘Nāgārjuna  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā  (Fundamental  Verses  of  the  Middle  Way)  Chapter 
24:  Examination  of  the  Four  Noble  Truths’,  in  eds.  William  Edelglass,  Jay  Garﬁeld,  Buddhist 
Philosophy:  Essential  readings  (Cary,  NC  2009),  pp.  26-34. 
141  Dreyfus,  ‘Madhyamaka  and  Classical  Greek  Skepticism’,  p.  19. 
142  Note:  these  are  post-sixth-century  Tibetan  schools.  The  Prāsangika  school,  following 
commentators  such  as  Buddhapālita,  Candrakīrti,  and  Tsongkhapa  asserts  that  we  cannot  make 
statements  with  regards  to  the  ultimate  truth  of  reality.  Bhāvyaviveka,  the  founder  of  the  o en 
criticised  Śvātantrika  school  (by  Tibetan  commentators),  argues  that  we  have  to  to  make  such 
statements  to  solve  Nāgārjuna’s  paradox.  The  latter  Śvātantrika  school  is  arguably  closer  to 
Greek  academic  skepticism  than  to  Pyrrhonian  skepticism. 
143  Dreyfus,  ‘Madhyamaka  and  Classical  Greek  Skepticism’,  p.  10. 
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laws  and  customs,  and  the  instruction  of  the  arts.  It  is  by  the  guidance 
of  nature  that  we  are  naturally  capable  of  sensation  and  thought.  It  is 
by  the  compulsion  of  the  feelings  that  hunger  leads  us  to  food  and 
thirst  leads  us  to  drink.  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  tradition  of  laws  and 
customs  that  in  everyday  life  we  accept  piety  as  good  and  impiety  as 
evil.  And  it  is  by  virtue  of  the  instruction  of  the  arts  we  are  not  inactive 
in  those  arts  we  employ.  All  these  statements,  however,  we  make 
without  prejudice.  144
 
Rather  than  being  nihilistic,  for  both  the  Madhyamaka  and  the  Pyrrhonian 
skeptic  their  skepticism  is  positive,  undogmatic,  and  above  all,  liberating.  They 
feel  no  need  to  conﬁrm  or  deny  how  things  really  are,  do  not  attach  themselves 
to  things  that  are  non-evident,   and  are  content  to  live  their  lives  as  it  comes  to 
them.   Skepticism  thus  becomes  a  weapon  against  dogmatic  beliefs,  a  means  to 145
achieve  a  life  free  of  worry,  and,  ultimately,  a  way  to  attain  state  of  mental 
tranquility  ( ataraxia ).  Hence,  McEvilley  concludes  that  ‘it  is  hard  to  identify  any 
signiﬁcant  diﬀerence  between  either  the  methods  or  the  stated  purposes  of 
Pyrrhonist  and  Madhyamika  dialectic.’  146
  Aside  from  the  doctrinal  overlap  between  Madhyamaka  and  Pyrrhonism, 
McEvilley  also  notes  several  parallels  in  their  respective  terminologies.  For 
example,  the  Greek  term  adiaphora ,  ‘non-diﬀerent  from  one  another’,  is  very 
similar  to  the  Sanskrit  laks‧an‧a-s´u-nya ,  ‘empty  of  distinguishing  marks’,  whereas 
astathmeta ,  ‘unstable  or  without  ﬁxed  essence,’  is  analogous  to  the  Sanskrit  anitya , 
‘impermanent’  or  ‘without  self-nature’  The  Greek  term  anepikrita ,  ‘unable  to  be 
grasped  by  concepts’,  also  has  several  parallels  in  Buddhism,  such  as  avya-kr.ta 
(indeterminable),  anabhilapya  (inexpressible),  and  atarka-vacara  (beyond  logical 
argument).   At  the  same  time,  McEvilley  (2002)  questions  the  idea  that  there 147
ever  was  a  direct  exchange  of  terms  and  ideas  between  Madhyamakas  and  Greek 
skepticism,  and  not  without  reason. 
  The  fundamental  problem  with  any  attempt  to  study  early  Pyrrhonism  is 
that  while  the  later  Pyrrhonists  such  as  Sextus  regarded  Pyrrho  as  the  founder  of 
their  school,  we  know  almost  nothing  about  Pyrrho’s  life.  Sextus  only  mentions 
Pyrrho  in  passing,  and  earlier  sources  are  either  fragmentary  or  unreliable.  His 
144   Sextus  Empiricus,  Outlines ,  p.  40. 
145  Dreyfus,  ‘Madhyamaka  and  Classical  Greek  Skepticism’,  pp.  19-20;  Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism ,  p.  26. 
146  McEvilley,  The  Shape  of  Ancient  Thought ,  p.  864. 
147  McEvilley,  The  Shape  of  Ancient  Thought ,  p.  805. 
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pupil  Timon  of  Phlius  (c.  320  BC  –  c.  230  BC) ,  a  celebrated  composer  of  satirical 
poems,  recorded  the  doctrines  of  Pyrrho,  but  unfortunately,  nearly  all  of 
Timon’s  works  are  lost.  The  most  valuable  surviving  record  of  Timon’s 
philosophy  is  a  much  later  text  by  Aristocles  of  Messene  (late  1st  c.  BC) ,  a 
follower  of  the  Peripatetic  school  of  philosophy  who  wrote  down  a  summary  of 
early  Pyrrhonian  doctrines.  Other  than  that,  the  only  other  major  early  source  is 
Antigonus  of  Carystus  (3rd  century  BC),  a  Greek  writer  who  o en  gets  cited  by 
our  most  important  source  of  biographical  information  on  Pyrrho,  the 
third-century  biographer  Diogenes  Laertius.  Alas,  Antigonus  seems  to  have  been 
working  from  an  older  Greek  tradition  where  writing  biographies  and  spreading 
sensationalist  gossip  are  o en  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  While  much  of  his 
information  on  Pyrrho  may  well  be  accurate,  his  overall  reliability  as  a  source  is 
questionable  at  best.  148
  So  what  do  we  know  about  Pyrrho’s  life?  He  appears  to  have  been  a  poor 
and  unknown  painter  who  came  under  the  inﬂuence  of  the  philosopher 
Anaxarchus  of  Abdera.  He  then  became  a  loyal  follower  of  Anaxarchus, 
eventually  accompanying  him  on  Alexander  the  Great’s  expedition  to  India.  In 
India,  Pyrrho  is  reported  to  have  encountered  the  so-called  gymnosophists ,  ‘naked 
philosophers’  or  ‘naked  wise  men’.  According  to  the  third-century  biographer 
Diogenes  Laertius,  this  encounter   ‘led  him  to  adopt  a  most  noble  philosophy  .  .  . 
taking  the  form  of  agnosticism  and  suspension  of  judgement.  He  denied  that 
anything  was  honourable  or  dishonourable,  just  or  unjust.  And  so,  universally, 
he  held  that  there  is  nothing  really  existent,  but  custom  and  convention  govern 
human  action;  for  no  single  thing  is  in  itself  any  more  this  than  that.’   A er  his 149
return  to  Greece,  Pyrrho  brought  back  with  him  the  philosophy  of  these 
gymnosophists  and  became  a  celebrated  ascetic,  attracting  numerous  followers, 
Timon  of  Phlius  being  the  most  famous  among  them.  They  called  themselves 
Pyrrhonians  a er  the  name  of  their  teacher.  Diogenes  also  reports  that  Pyrrho 
was  so  respected  by  his  native  city  of  Elis  that  he  was  made  high  priest,  and  that 
from  then  on  the  city  exempted  philosophers  from  taxation,  whereas  Athens 
apparently  rewarded  Pyrrho  with  citizenship  for  having  slain  the  Thracian 
Cotys.   Indeed,  it  appears  that  Pyrrho  did  achieve  a  certain  level  of  fame 150
during  his  own  lifetime,  as  the  second-century  Greek  travel  writer  Pausanias 
148  Richard  Bett,  Pyrrho,  His  Antecedents  and  His  Legacy  (New  York  2000),  pp.  1-13. 
149  Diogenes  Laertius,  Lives  of  the  Eminent  Philosophers ,  transl.  Robert  Drew  Hicks  (London  1925), 
Book  IX,  61. 
150  Ibid.,  Book  IX,  64-5. 
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remarks  (6.24.5)  seeing  a  statue  of  Pyrrho  in  Elis.  151
  The  most  crucial  piece  of  information  in  Diogenes’  account,  is,  of  course, 
Pyrrho’s  reported  encounter  with  the  gymnosophists .  Assuming  that  the 
encounter  did  in  fact  take  place  and  that  these  ‘naked  wise  men’  were  Buddhists, 
Pyrrho  may  indeed  have  introduced  Buddhism  to  Greece,  or  at  least  his 
interpretation  of  it.  Such  an  encounter  would  certainly  not  be  unique.  At  least 
one  of  the  gymnosophists ,  who  was  known  as  Kalanos  to  the  Greeks,  accompanied 
Alexander  to  Persis,  where  he  ultimately  committed  suicide  by  self-immolation. 
This  must  have  made  quite  an  impression  on  the  Greeks,  because  the 
self-immolation  of  Kalanos  was  recorded  by  several  authors,  including 
eyewitnesses,  and  reported  by  numerous  later  Greek  and  Roman  authors, 
including  Strabo,  Diodorus,  Cicero,  Athenaeus,  Aelian,  and  Curtius  Rufus.  152
Remarkably,  a  letter  by  Kalanos  to  Alexander  was  also  preserved  by  the  Jewish 
philosopher  Philo  of  Alexandria  (c.  20  BC  –  c.  50  AD),  who  describes  Kalanos  as 
being  Indian  by  birth.   Of  course,  one  cannot  immediately  assume  that  the 153
letter  is  genuine,  but  since  Philo  is  not  known  to  have  invented  his  sources,  it 
does  give  credence  to  the  story  of  Kalanos’  self-immolation.  
  Although  the  gymnosophists  have  been  reported  in  ancient  sources  as 
hailing  from  India,  their  identity  has  long  been  something  of  a  mystery  in 
Western  scholarship.  They  have  variously  been  identiﬁed  as  Jains,  Brahmins, 
Buddhists,  or  followers  of  Sañjaya  Belaṭṭhiputta,  an  Indian  ascetic  teacher  who 
was  a  contemporary  of  Shakyamuni  Buddha.   Based  on  a  combination  of 154
historical  and  archaeological  evidence,  however,  Georgios  Halkias  (2015)  has 
more  recently  argued  that  the  gymnosophists  Alexander’s  expedition  encountered 
in  Gandhāra   were  likely  Buddhists.   According  to  Halkias,  the  claim  that  the 155 156
gymnosophists  were  Jains  is  not  corroborated  by  any  archaeological  evidence,  as 
there  are  no  signs  indicating  a  Jain  presence  in  Gandhāra  or  the  surrounding 
areas.   Moreover,  the  Jain  doctrine  of  nonviolence  forbids  them  from  handling 157
ﬁre,  for  ﬁre  is  likely  to  harm  or  kill  any  surrounding  insects.  This  makes  it 
151  Pausanias,  Pausanias’  Description  of  Greece ,  Vol.  4,  ed.  transl.  J.G.  Frazer  (New  York  2012),  p.  104. 
152  Bezalel  Bar-Kochva,  The  Image  of  the  Jews  in  Greek  Literature:  The  Hellenistic  Period  (Berkeley 
2010),  pp.  60-61. 
153  Bar-Kochva,  The  Image  of  the  Jews ,  p.  61. 
154  Evrard  Flintoﬀ,  ‘Pyrrho  and  India’,  Phronesis  25  (1),  pp.  88-108. 
155  An  ancient  Indian  kingdom  in  the  northwestern  region  of  modern-day  Pakistan. 
156  Georgios  Halkias,  ‘The  Self-immolation  of  Kalanos  and  other  Luminous  Encounters  Among 
Greeks  and  Indian  Buddhists  in  the  Hellenistic  World’,  Journal  of  the  Oxford  Centre  for  Buddhist 
Studies  8  (2015),  pp.  163-168. 
157  Halkias,  ‘The  Self-immolation  of  Kalanos’,  p.  166. 
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extremely  unlikely  that  at  least  Kalanos,  who  is  widely  reported  to  have  killed 
himself  by  self-immolation,  was  a  Jain.  In  contrast,  Buddhism  has  a 
longstanding  tradition  of  ritualistic  preoccupation  with  ﬁre,  cremation  and 
self-immolation.  
  Halkias  also  doubts  the  idea  that  Kalanos  was  a  follower  of  Sañjaya 
Belaṭṭhiputta.  While  Sañjaya  encouraged  skepticism,  he  did  not  share  the 
ultimate  Buddhist  and  Pyrrhonian  goal  of  mental  tranquility.  Both  Helkias  and 
Kuzminski  (2008)  suggest  that  Sañjaya’s  use  of  fourfold  negation  ( catuṣkoṭi ),  a 
logical  argument  which  several  centuries  later  became  particularly  associated 
with  Madhyamaka  school  and  closely  parallels  Pyrrhonism’s  tetralemma ,  was 
already  widely  employed  by  early  Buddhists,  and  possibly  by  other  Indian 
philosophical  schools  as  well.   158
  Finally,  while  the  great  Gandhāran  capital  city  Takshashila  was  a  major 
center  of  both  Hinduism  and  early  Buddhism,  Helkias  doubts  that  Kalanos  was  a 
Hindu.  As   the  Greeks  came  into  contact  with  Indian  ascetics,  they  eventually 
distinguished  between  the  powerful  brachmanes ,  and  the  sarmanai ,  wandering 
ascetics  who,  unlike  the  brachmanes  did  not  tend  to  serve  the  interests  of  the 
ruling  class.   Nearchos,  Alexander’s  admiral  and  according  to  Helkias  a  reliable 159
historian  as  well  as  the  ﬁrst  to  point  out  the  brachmanes /non- brachmanes 
distiction,  states  that  Kalanos  belonged  to  the  ‘non- brachmanes ’.  Nearchos’ 
statement  and  Kalanos’  apparent  reasons  for  serving  Alexander   seem  to 160
suggest  that  Kalanos  would  have  belonged  to  the  sarmanai  under  the  later  Greek 
brachmanes/sarmanai  division.   In  short,  while  we  cannot  know  for  sure  whether 161
the  gymnosophists  Pyrrho  reportedly  encountered  in  India  were  Buddhists  given 
the  lack  of  concrete  evidence,  it  is  at  least  highly  plausible.  
  If  Pyrrho  did  come  into  contact  with  the  gymnosophists  like  Diogenes 
Laertius  claims,  there  is,  of  course,  still  the  problem  of  communication.  Since 
Greeks  were  highly  dismissive  of  any  languages  other  than  Greek,  Bett  (2003) 
concludes  that  it  is  unlikely  that  there  would  have  been  any  signiﬁcant  exchange 
of  philosophical  ideas  between  Greeks  and  Indians.   Bett  certainly  has  a  point, 162
but  at  the  same  time  it  is  important  not  to  fall  into  the  trap  of  making  sweeping 
generalisations.  Kingsley  (1995),  critical  of  such  generalising  statements  by 
158  Ibid.,  p.  168;  Kuzminski,  Pyrrhonism ,  p.  45. 
159  Ibid.,  p.  169;  Beckwith,  Greek  Buddha ,  pp.  102-104. 
160  Provision  for  the  welfare  of  his  children. 
161  Halkias,  ‘The  Self-immolation  of  Kalanos’,  p.  172. 
162  Bett,  Pyrrho ,  pp.  176-178. 
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classicists,  states  that  while  ancient  Greeks  did  not  maintain  formal  schools  for 
language  translation,  Greeks  did  learn  foreign  languages  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  163
Pyrrho  spent  three  years  in  Bactria  and  nearly  two  years  in  India,  enough  time 
to  pick  up  a  foreign  language.   164
  Nevertheless,  there  are  more  problems  still,  and  those  problems  concern 
interpretation.  Since   we  we  cannot  simply  assume  that  the  early  Pyrrhonism  of 
Pyrrho  and  Timon  of  Phlius  was  the  same  as  the  Pyrrhonism  set  out  by  Sextus 
in  the  Outlines —Pyrrho  had  been  dead  for  over  four  centuries  when  Sextus  was 
alive—we  have  to  rely  on  older,  more  incomplete  sources.  As  mentioned  before, 
the  only  other   reliable  source  on  Pyrrho’s  philosophy  is  a  text  by  Aristocles  in 
which  he  provides  a  summary  of  the  philosophical  ideas  of  Timon  of  Phlius. 
According  to  Aristocles’  account,  Timon  states  that  in  order  to  reach  a  state  of 
happiness,  one  has  to  focus  on  three  related  questions:  First  of  all,  what  is  the 
nature  of  things?  Second,  depending  on  the  answer  to  the  ﬁrst  question,  what 
should  our  attitude  towards  these  things  be?  And  ﬁnally,  what  will  happen  if  we 
adopt,  adiaphora ,  astathmeta ,  and  anepikrita ,  the  answers  recommended  by 
Pyrrho  and  Timon?   165
The  initial  question  ‘what  is  the  nature  of  things’?  Is  especially 
problematic  because  it  can  be  interpreted  in  two  very  diﬀerent  ways.  If  the 
nature  of  things  is  adiaphora ,  ‘non-diﬀerent  from  one  another’,  astathmeta , 
‘unstable  or  without  ﬁxed  essence,’  and  anepikrita ,  ‘unable  to  be  grasped  by 
concepts’,  does  that  mean  they  are  as  such  in  their  very  nature?  Are  things 
inherently  undeterminable?  Or  does  it  mean  that  humans  are  simply  incapable 
of  determining  the  nature  of  things  because  of  our  limited  sensory  capabilities? 
The  ﬁrst  interpretation  would  almost  certainly  have  been  condemned  by  Sextus 
as  a  form  of  dogmatism,  whereas  the  second  interpretation  can  be  seen  as 
related  to  the  late  Pyrrhonism  of  Sextus,  although  even  here  there  is  still  some 
distance  between  the  two.  A er  all,  saying  that  we  are  unable  to  determine  the 
nature  of  things  (Pyrrho/Timon)  is  diﬀerent  from  saying  that  we  have  thus  far 
been  unable  to  determine  the  nature  of  things  (Sextus).  At  the  same  time,  it  is 
important  to  remember  that  both  interpretations  still  promise  the  same  result: 
163  Peter  Kingley,  Ancient  Philosophy,  Mystery,  and  Magic:  Empedocles  and  Pythagorean  Tradition 
(Oxford  1995),  p.  195. 
164  Halkias,  ‘The  Self-immolation  of  Kalanos’,  p.  165. 
165  Bett,  Pyrrho ,  pp.  14-36. 
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ataraxia  or  tranquility.   166
  Similarly  to  how  the  connection  between  Pyrrho  and  Sextus  is  diﬃcult  to 
reconstruct,  the  study  of  early  Buddhism  is  problematic  because  the  earliest 
texts  date  from  the  ﬁrst  century  AD.  These  include  the  Gandhāran  Buddhist 
texts  and  the  much  more  well-known  Pali  Canon,  which  still  forms  the  standard 
collection  of  scripture  in  the  Theravada  tradition.  Rather  than  the  word  of 
Shakyamuna  Buddha  himself,  these  texts  are  the  preserved  teachings  of  a  long 
succession  of  Buddhist  teachers.   Undoubtedly,  these  teachings  reﬂect  the 167
Buddha’s  original  teachings  at  its  core,  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  nearly 
impossible  to  accurately  reconstruct  early  Gandhāran  Buddhism  from  the 
Hellenistic  period.  One  crucial  diﬀerence  between  early  Buddhism  and  early 
Pyrrhonism  is  that  Buddhism  was  continually  kept  alive  by  a  succession  of 
Buddhist  teachers,  whereas,  contrary  to  what  Diogenes  claims,  Pyrrhonism 
seems  to  have  disappeared  until  it  was  refounded  by  a  certain  Aenesidemus  of 
Knossos  in  the  ﬁrst  century  B.C.  168
  Taking  into  account  all  the  available  evidence,  as  well  as  the  serious  issues 
that  plague  the  hypothesis  of  a  direct  transfer  of  Buddhist  ideas  from  India  to 
Greece,  it  is  once  again  impossible  to  determine  with  any  degree  of  certainty 
whether  Hume  was  inﬂuenced  by  Buddhist  ideas,  whether  it  be  with  or  without 
his  knowledge.  Hume  was  clearly  familiar  with  Sextus  at  a  superﬁcial  level  at 
least,  and  the  philosophical  convergence  between  late  Pyrrhonism  and 
Madhyamaka  is  undeniable,  but  the  historical  evidence  is  scarce  and  full  of 
uncertainties.  Beckwith  seems  to  accept  Diogenes  Laertius’  account  as  fact, 
which  is  an  untenable  position.  That  does  not  mean  Buddhism  did  not  make  its 
way  to  Greece —there  was  signiﬁcant  exchange  of  culture,  architecture,  and 
religion  between  India  and  the  Hellenistic  successor  states  a er  all—but  to  make 
that  claim  requires  additional  evidence.  The  only  explicit  historical  source  at 
this  point  in  time  is  Diogenes  Laertius’  questionable  biography  of  Pyrrho, 
written  centuries  a er  the  latter’s  death.  
   
166  Svavar  Hrafn  Svavarson,  ‘The  Pyrrhonian  Idea  of  a  Good  Life’,  in  eds.   Øyvind  Rabbås,  Eyjólfur 
Kjalar  Emilsson,  Hallvard  Fossheim,  Miira  Tuominen  The  Quest  for  the  Good  Life:  Ancient 
Philosophers  on  Happiness ,  pp.  199-200. 
167  Robert  Grombrich  believes  the  Pali  Canon  must  have  been  the  word  of  a  single  person: 
Shakyamuni  Buddha,  see  :  Richard  F.  Gombrich,  Theravada  Buddhism  (London  2006),  p.  20. 
168  Svavarson,  ‘The  Pyrrhonian  Idea  of  a  Good  Life’,  p.  202. 
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Conclusion 
The  notion  that  Hume  was  somehow  inﬂuenced  by  Buddhist  ideas  when  he 
composed  his  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  is  not  a  new  one.  For  decades, 
philosophers,  Buddhist  scholars,  psychologists,  and  others  have  noted  the 
striking  similarities  between  Humean  and  Buddhist  philosophy  on  substance 
and  the  personal  self.  The  parallels  with  Madhyamaka  are  particularly  strong, 
and  will  likely  continue  to  fascinate  philosophers  for  decades  to  come.  Of 
course,  philosophical  convergence  alone  is  not  enough  evidence  for  Buddhist 
inﬂuence,  which  encouraged  Alison  Gopnik  to  ﬁnd  additional  historical 
evidence.  Gopnik’s  research  on  the  Jesuit  College  of  La  Flèche  shows  that  Hume 
may  indeed  have  been  in  a  position  to  absorb  Buddhist  ideas  from  La  Flèche’s 
learned  Jesuit  ex-missionaries  ﬁrsthand,  some  of  whom  had  travelled  to  Siam, 
India,  and  even  remote  Tibet.  
  At  the  same  time,  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  writing  of  the 
Treatise  are  so  vague,  and  Gopnik’s  assumptions  so  speciﬁc,  that  with  each 
successive  assumption  the  likelihood  that  Hume  learned  about  Buddhism 
ﬁrsthand  decreases  rapidly.  We  simply  do  not  know  what  Hume’s  interactions 
with  the  Jesuits  were  like,  other  than  that  he  claims  to  have  discussed  miracles 
once.  Nor  do  we  know  how  frequent  such  interactions  were,  or  whether  he 
spoke  to  the  old  and  learned  Father  Charles  Francois  Dolu,  an  ex-missionary  to 
Siam  who  may  have  received  accurate  information  on  Tibetan  Buddhism  from 
his  Italian  colleague  Ippolito  Desideri,  although,  again,  this  is  far  from  certain. 
Although  Hume  never  mentions  Buddhism  in  his  writings,  the  Treatise 
was  indebted  to  Pierre  Bayle’s  massive  Dictionary .  Through  the  Dictionary’s 
Spinoza  and  Japan  entries,  Hume  may  in  fact  have  learned  about  Bayle’s 
interpretation  of  Buddhist  philosophy,  which  were  in  turn  based  on  older  Jesuit 
interpretations  on  Buddhism,  primarily  from  Japan.  However,  Bayle  relied  on 
ﬂawed  Jesuit  sources,  and  his  attempt  to  connect  ‘ancient,  virtuous  Asian  sects’  to 
Spinozism  reﬂects  the  rising  ‘threat  of  atheism’  in  Western  Europe  around  the 
turn  of  the  eighteenth  century  more  than  anything  else.  Moreover,  it  is 
uncertain  whether  Hume  was  familiar  with  the  second  1702  edition,  which 
included  the  newly  added  texts  on   Japan  and  the  ‘Sect  of  Foe’,  or  just  the  1697 
edition  that  did  not  yet  include  them.  
  Finally,  the  fact  that  Hume  was  at  least  somewhat  familiar  with  Sextus’ 
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Empiricus  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism  suggests  that  he  may  have  been  studying  early 
Buddhist  ideas  that  were  imported  to  Greece  and  reinvented  by  Pyrrho  and  his 
followers;  but  again,  this  reading  of  Hume  suﬀers  from  a  great  deal  of 
uncertainty,  not  just  because  we  are  unsure  precisely  how  familiar  with 
Pyrrhonian  skepticism  Hume  was,  but  also  because  the  connection  between 
early  Pyrrhonism  and  the  late  Pyrrhonism  of  Sextus  is  shrouded  in  uncertainty. 
It  is  far  from  evident  that  Pyrrhonism  was  an  import  from  India  to  Greece, 
complicated  by  an  overall  lack  of  reliable  sources  and  by  the  fact  that  there  are 
no  Buddhist  texts  from  as  early  as  the  third  century  B.C.  Nevertheless,  the 
apparent  similarities  between  Pyrrhonism  and  Madhyamaka  Buddhism  in 
particular  are  striking,  and  subsequent  comparative  research  will  undoubtedly 
shed  more  light  on  the  exchange  of  ideas  between  Indian  and  Greek 
philosophers.  
  It  was  never  the  aim  of  this  study  to  either  prove  or  disprove  the  possible 
inﬂuence  of  Buddhism  on  David  Hume.  There  is  simply  too  little  available 
evidence  to  make  any  such  claims  in  certain  terms.  Rather,  it  aimed  to  combine 
historical  analysis  with  philosophical  analysis,  incorporate  Gopnik’s  ﬁndings  into 
the  debate,  and  discuss  the  claims  of  Kuzminski  (2008)  and  Beckwith  (2015)  that 
Hume  learned  about  Buddhist  indirectly  through  Sextus  Empiricus.  It  should 
therefore  primarily  be  seen  as  an  exercise  in  comparative  analysis,  where 
seemingly  diﬀerent  ideas  separated  by  vast  distances  of  time  and  space  may  in 
fact  share  mutual  connections,  and  may  even  end  up  inﬂuencing  one  another  at 
diﬀerent  times  in  history  in  diﬀerent  places.  Such  an  approach  is  certainly  not 
guaranteed  to  be  fruitful,  but  it  does  provide  a  fresh,  and,  when  provided  with 
enough  evidence,  potentially  groundbreaking  way  to  look  at  the  history  of  ideas. 
Recent  research  on  the  Western  European  discovery  of  Sino-Japanese 
Zen  Buddhism  by  Urs  Arpp,  Thierry  Meynard,  and  others  has  already  revealed 
how  ﬂawed,  much  older  Jesuit  texts  managed  to  inform  popular  intellectual 
opinion  in  late  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  Western  Europe.  This 
discovery  of  Buddhism,  as  well  as  the  rediscovery  of  Pyrrhonism  during  the 
early  modern  period  reinforced  a  gradually  emerging  wave  of  skepticism  that 
captured  the  hearts  and  minds  of  radical  intellectuals  like  Pierre  Bayle  and 
others.  Hume  would  soon  follow  in  their  footsteps. 
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